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Abstract
This Article begins by taking a closer look at the two Security Council resolutions at the center
of this debate: Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1540. It argues that they make pragmatic sense as
necessary responses by the Security Council to address urgent, global threats. Further, it explains
how they serve to fill the existing gaps in international law, which, if not addressed, would hin-
der the international community’s ability to tackle these twenty-first century threats. Part II, after
providing a brief summary of the Council’s powers under the U.N. Charter, focuses on whether
this activity falls within the Security Council’s mandate. In doing so, Part II describes the breadth
of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII, which are subject to few express limitations. Many
commentators cite the limitation that the Council may only address a particular situation, with a
time-limited, case-based reaction, to support their conclusion that while the Council may have the
authority to legislate in response to a specific situation, it lacks the authority to do so on a global
basis. Part II concludes, however, that this limitation, which does not actually appear in the text
of the Charter itself, is in fact not sufficient to circumscribe the Council’s activity in this area. To
continue to read such a limitation into the Charter at a time when the most urgent threats to inter-
national peace and security are neither time nor geographically limited would prevent the Council
from being able to fulfill its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and
security through “prompt and effective action.” Part III of this Article looks at previous Council
actions that have imposed binding obligations on all States, albeit not in response to a global (vice
specific) threat. It explains that the adoption of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 constitutes a qualita-
tively different exercise of the Council’s Chapter VII power, which is manifested in a number of
ways. Part III concludes, however, that this difference serves to highlight the innovative nature of
the Council’s activity rather than make it ultra vires. Despite the unique nature of Resolutions 1373
and 1540, the discretion given to the Council under the Charter, both in terms of determining the
existence of threats to the peace and the appropriate enforcement measures to address such threats,
appears broad enough to allow for this innovative activity. Part IV addresses the impact that this
Security Council activity, which essentially excludes the 176 U.N. Members that are not on the
Council from the decision-making process, will have on the traditional consent-based international
law-making process. It highlights some of the limitations of this process, which become more pro-
nounced when the United Nations is confronted with the pressing need to fill a legal gap. Part IV
concludes that in these circumstances the innovative use of Council powers, while circumvent-
ing the cumbersome multilateral treaty-making approach, is nevertheless justified. Recognizing
that the U.N. Charter has evolved to allow the Council to act as a “global legislator” under cer-
tain circumstances, Part V argues that there are some safeguards the Council should implement
each time it uses this authority. Such safeguards are needed to maintain the Council’s institutional
“legitimacy,” ensuring that the Council exercise this broad power in ways that most States deem
appropriate and within its competence. This will induce the broad cooperation from States that is
needed to assure the most effective use of this authority. As this Article concludes, the Council
needs the ability to use this tool to address, within the State-centered U.N. Charter system in which
it operates, the threats posed by non-State terrorists and terrorist groups.
ARTICLES
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS "GLOBAL




The U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003 with-
out a resolution comparable to the one that launched the first
Gulf War, and the continuing dispute as to whether this action
was or was not "illegal" under the U.N. Charter, has been at the
center of the debate concerning the role of the United Nations
in the twenty-first century.' This dispute, however, has overshad-
owed the discussion surrounding a developing Security Council
practice with perhaps even greater implications for both the
United Nations and its Member States: namely, the Security
Council's adoption of resolutions that impose far-reaching, bind-
ing obligations on all 191 U.N. Member States. The Security
Council has taken this action, which has been described as
"global legislating" - as distinguished from taking decisions,
which impose binding obligations that relate to a particular dis-
pute or situation - as part of its effort to address the global
terrorist threat.2 Specifically, the Security Council has adopted
* Deputy Legal Counselor at the United States Mission to the United Nations in
New York. The views and opinions expressed are those of the Author and do not neces-
sarily represent those of the United States Mission or the Department of State.
1. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/678 (1990).
Some have concluded that the United States and its allies had the necessary Security
Council approval for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. See, e.g., Nicholas Rostow, Deter-
mining the Lawfulness of the 2003 Campaign Against Iraq, 2004 ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS 16,
34 (2004) (asserting that "the Security Council actions on Iraq, including the 1990 au-
thorization to use force and the repeated findings of Iraq's failure to carry out its cease
fire obligations . . . created a compelling legal foundation for the 2003 campaign"
against Iraq); William H. Taft, IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003) (arguing that the legality of the use of force against
Iraq in March 2003 derives from earlier U.N. Security Council resolutions).
2. SeeJose Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 874, 875
n.9 (2003) [hereinafter Alvarez, Hegemonic]; see also Roberto Lavalle, A Novel, If Awk-
ward, Exercise In International Law-Making: Security Council Resolution 1540, 51 NETH.
INT'L L. REv. 411 (2004); Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Con-
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two resolutions imposing obligations on all States to take a series
of steps to combat terrorism and prevent weapons of mass de-
struction ("WMD") from getting into the hands of terrorists. 3
Adoption of these resolutions has been described as a "fast-
track" procedure under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter for ad-
dressing global threats to international peace and security.4
This action has been applauded in some circles as an impor-
tant exercise of the Council's powers, an extraordinary response
to an extraordinary threat and a positive contribution to the
U.N. fight against terrorism. The Council's use of this tool, how-
ever, has been also questioned and criticized by some commen-
tators and governments as falling outside the Security Council's
mandate.5 The Council, they argue, was not intended to act as a
stitution of the United Nations, 16 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 593 (2003); Gilbert Guillaume, Terror-
ism and International Law, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 540-43 (2004) (providing the text
of the Grotius Lecture given at the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2002).
3. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1373
(2001); see also S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1540
(2004).
4. See United Nations & Global Security, International Conference, The United
Nations and New Threats: Rethinking Security 13 (May 27-29, 2004), available at http:/
/www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/reports/Rome-conference-rep.pdf (last visited Feb.
27, 2005) [hereinafter Rome U.N. Conference Report].
5. See, e.g., Happold, supra note 2, at 593 (asserting that in enacting Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1373, the Council acted ultra vires); see also Statement by Permanent Rep-
resentative of Egypt, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1) (2004); Statement by Vijay Nambiar, Representa-
tive of India, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 23, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (expressing "concern about the increasing tendency of the Se-
curity Council in recent years to assume new and wider powers of legislating on behalf
of the international community, with its resolutions binding on all States"); Statement
by Rezlan Ishar Jenie, Permanent Representative of Indonesia, to the United Nations,
U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004); Statement by
Permanent Representative of Iran, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
4950th mtg. at 32, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004); Statement by Permanent Representa-
tive of Namibia, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 16, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1) (2004); Statement by Permanent Representative of
Nepal, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.4950 (Resumption 1) (2004); Statement by Ndekhedehe Effiong Ndekjedehe, Per-
manent Representative of Nigeria, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
4950th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1) (2004); Statement by Kishore
Mahbubani, Representative of Singapore, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th
Sess., 4950th mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (questioning whether the Security
Council can assume the role of treaty-making or legislate rules for Member States);
Statement by Permanent Representative of South Africa, to the United Nations, U.N.
SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004); Statement by Perma-
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"global legislator."6 They fear that such action could disrupt the
balance of power between the Council and the General Assem-
bly as set forth in the Charter.7 Moreover, they assert that having
the Security Council, a fifteen-Member body not accountable to
other U.N. organs, impose obligations on all 191 members
threatens to weaken one of the cornerstones of the traditional
international law structure, namely, the principle that interna-
tional law is based on the consent of States.8
This Article begins by taking a closer look at the two Secur-
ity Council resolutions at the center of this debate: Resolution
1373' and Resolution 1540.10 I will argue that they make prag-
matic sense as necessary responses by the Security Council to ad-
dress urgent, global threats. Further, I will explain how they
serve to fill the existing gaps in international law, which, if not
addressed, would hinder the international community's ability to
tackle these twenty-first century threats. Part II, after providing a
brief summary of the Council's powers under the U.N. Charter,
will focus on whether this activity falls within the Security Coun-
cil's mandate. In doing so, Part II will describe the breadth of
the Council's powers under Chapter VII, which are subject to
nent Representative of Switzerland, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
4950th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Statement by Mourad Benmehidi, Deputy Representative of Algeria, to
the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5059th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5059
(2004) (commenting on the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1566, which in-
cludes a paragraph which some have argued is an attempt by the Security Council to
offer a definition of terrorism, thereby encroaching upon the prerogatives of the Gen-
eral Assembly); Lavalle, supra note 2, at 418 (arguing that the General Assembly, "by
reason of the universality of its composition, is better suited than the Council to legis-
late for the international community").
7. See, e.g., Happold, supra note 2, at 607; Statement by H.E. Ambassador Christian
Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein, to the
United Nations, at 3 (Oct. 11, 2004), available at http://www.un.int/liechtenstein/10-
10-2004%20Statement%20SC%2OReform.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (stating that
with the adoption of Resolution 1373, the Security Council has expanded its activities
into the field of law-making, a sphere that is reserved to the General Assembly under
the Charter, adding that this "raises fundamental questions which affect the institu-
tional balance of the Organization"); Statement by Vijay Nambiar, Representative of
India, supra note 5, at 23; Statement by Rezlan IsharJenie, Permanent Representative of
Indonesia, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that "any far-reaching assumption of authority by
the Security Council to enact global legislation is not consistent with the provisions of
the United Nations Charter").
8. See, e.g., Rome U.N. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 14.
9. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3.
10. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3.
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few express limitations. Many commentators cite the limitation
that the Council may only address a particular situation, with a
time-limited, case-based reaction, to support their conclusion
that while the Council may have the authority to legislate in re-
sponse to a specific situation, it lacks the authority to do so on a
global basis.' 1 Part II will conclude, however, that this limitation,
which does not actually appear in the text of the Charter itself, is
in fact not sufficient to circumscribe the Council's activity in this
area. To continue to read such a limitation into the Charter at a
time when the most urgent threats to international peace and
security are neither time nor geographically limited would pre-
vent the Council from being able to fulfill its responsibility
under the Charter to maintain international peace and security
through "prompt and effective action." 2
Part III of this Article will look at previous Council actions
that have imposed binding obligations on all States, albeit not in
response to a global (vice specific) threat. It will explain that the
adoption of Resolutions 1373"s and 154014 constitutes a qualita-
tively different exercise of the Council's Chapter VII power,
which is manifested in a number of ways. Part III will conclude,
however, that this difference serves to highlight the innovative
nature of the Council's activity rather than make it ultra vires.
Despite the unique nature of Resolutions 1373 and 1540, the dis-
cretion given to the Council under the Charter, both in terms of
determining the existence of threats to the peace and the appro-
priate enforcement measures to address such threats, appears
broad enough to allow for this innovative activity.
Part IV will address the impact that this Security Council ac-
tivity, which essentially excludes the 176 U.N. Members that are
not on the Council from the decision-making process, will have
11. The widely accepted definition of "legislation" in the context of the United
Nations has three characteristics: the resolution must be unilateral in form, create or
modify some element of a legal norm, and the legal norm in question must be general
in nature, that is directed to indeterminate addresses and capable of repeated applica-
tion over time. See EDWARD YEMIN, LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS
SPECIAUZED AGENCIES 6 (1969); see also Happold, supra note 2, at 597; Jose Alvarez, The
Security Council's War on Terrorism: Problems and Policy Options, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 119, 120-21 (Erika de Wet & Andre Nollkaemper eds.,
2003) [hereinafter Alvarez, War on Terrorism]; Fredric Kirgis, The Security Council's First
Fifty Years, 89 Am.J. INT'L L. 506, 520 (1995).
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
13. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3.
14. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3.
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on the traditional consent-based international law-making pro-
cess. It will highlight some of the limitations of this process,
which become more pronounced when the United Nations is
confronted with the pressing need to fill a legal gap. Part IV will
conclude that in these circumstances the innovative use of Coun-
cil powers, while circumventing the cumbersome multilateral
treaty-making approach, is nevertheless justified.
Recognizing that the U.N. Charter has evolved to allow the
Council to act as a "global legislator" under certain circum-
stances, Part V will argue that there are some safeguards the
Council should implement each time it uses this authority. Such
safeguards are needed to maintain the Council's institutional
"legitimacy," ensuring that the Council exercise this broad
power in ways that most States deem appropriate and within its
competence. This will induce the broad cooperation from States
that is needed to assure the most effective use of this authority.
As this Article concludes, the Council needs the ability to use
this tool to address, within the 'State-centered U.N. Charter sys-
tem in which it operates, the threats posed by non-State ter-
rorists and terrorist groups.
I. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1373 AND 1540: A
. TRIUMPH OF PRAGMATISM
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Council,
like a number of governments and other international bodies,
took unprecedented steps to increase its contribution to the
fight against terrorism. Perhaps its most important action was
the adoption of Resolution 137315 on September 28, 2001. The
Council had previously adopted resolutions condemning terror-
ism generally or addressing specific terrorist acts, often in the
context of State-sponsored terrorism.16 In the aftermath of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, however, the Council sought to address the
global terrorist threat posed, not by States, but by non-State ter-
rorists and terrorist groups. The Council imposed a series of ob-
15. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3.
16. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3952d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.1214 (1998) (condemning certain acts of the Taliban in Afghanistan); S.C. Res.
1189, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3915th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1189 (1998) (condemn-
ing the terrorist bombings in Kenya and Tanzania); S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3033d mtg. at 51, U.N. Doc. S/731 (1992) (condemning the destruction of Pan
Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 "and the resultant loss of lives").
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ligations on all States, requiring them to take various measures
to enhance their capacity to combat terrorism.1 7 It required all
States, inter alia, to criminalize terrorist financing activity, freeze
terrorist funds, refrain from providing "active or passive" support
to terrorists, and deny safe haven to terrorists and their support-
ers.
1 8
Some two and a half years later the Council again sought to
tackle a global threat in a comprehensive way, this time the
threat posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery, in particular, the threat that terrorists and other non-
State actors might acquire such weapons.19 Again, faced with a
global threat potentially emanating from both non-State actors
as well as any State, the Council decided to adopt a resolution
that imposed a series of far-reaching obligations on all States. It
required them to refrain from providing support to non-State
actors attempting to manufacture, possess, transport, or use
WMD and their means of delivery. 20 It further required them to
prohibit in domestic law any such activities by non-State actors,
particularly for terrorist purposes, and prohibit assistance or fi-
nancing of such activities. 21 It obligated States to adopt mea-
sures to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery, including by accounting for and physically protecting
such items, establishing effective border controls and law en-
forcement measures. 22
The two resolutions share a number of elements. In each
instance, the Council is responding, not to a specific situation or
threat but to one of a global nature. 23 Additionally, as noted,
both use the Council's authority under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter to impose far-reaching binding obligations on all
States. 24 Whether this constituted an appropriate use of this au-
thority will be discussed below. In doing so, both resolutions
seek to establish global norms, while leaving considerable discre-
17. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3.
18. See id. 1-3.
19. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, 1.
20. See id.
21. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, 2.
22. See id.
23. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3; see also S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3.
24. SeeJane E. Stromseth, An Imperial Security Council? Implementing Security Council
Resolutions 1373 and 1390, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 41, 42 (2003) [hereinafter
Stromseth, Imperial Security Council].
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tion to each State to decide how best to implement those norms
consistent with its domestic system. Moreover, both are seeking
to fill a recognized gap in existing international law regimes re-
lating to counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, thus devi-
ating from the traditional method of creating multilateral obli-
gations, namely, the intergovernmental treaty-making process.
2 5
In addition, each resolution established a committee of the Se-
curity Council, consisting of all fifteen Council members, to
monitor States' implementation of the relevant resolution, and
requested States to report to the committee on their implemen-
tation efforts.26 The effectiveness of each resolution will de-
pend, in large part, on whether these committees will be able to
secure cooperation from States.27
From a purely pragmatic perspective, this Council behavior
should be welcomed. The Council's objective in adopting Reso-
lution 1373 was to convince all U.N. Member States to do more
to combat terrorism. 28 The global nature of the terrorist prob-
lem is difficult to dispute. Given the proven mobility of ter-
rorists, the permeable nature of borders, the different and evolv-
ing sources of terrorist financing, and the ability of terrorists to
identify and exploit those countries with weak counter-terrorist
infrastructure, it is also hard to question the logic behind the
Council's decision to require all States to take action to combat
terrorism. Partly as a result of Resolution 1373, and the work of
its offspring, the Counter-Terrorism Committee ("CTC") ,29 al-
most every country has taken steps to enhance its counter-terror-
ism machinery, whether in the form of adopting anti-terrorism
25. See Lavalle, supra note 2, at 418; see also Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality
of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1492, 1515 (2004); J6st Delbrfick, Trans-
national Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public Authority Beyond the State, 11
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 36 (2004); Alvarez, Hegemonic, supra note 2, at 875;
Happold, supra note 2, at 594; Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-
Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333, 334 (2003)
[hereinafter Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373]; Nicholas Rostow, Before and After.
The Changed U.N. Response to Terrorism Since September 11th, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 475,
482 (2002); Szasz, supra note 2, at 902.
26. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3, 6; see also S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, 4.
27. See generally GABRIEL H. OOSTHUIZEN & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, TERRORISM AND
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 (2004), available
at http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/il/BPO904.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
28. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3.
29. See Counter-Terrorism Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373,
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/about.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2005).
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legislation, strengthening border controls, becoming party to in-
ternational treaties related to terrorism, or becoming proactive
in denying safe haven to terrorists and their supporters.3 °
Furthermore, the adoption of Resolution 1373 makes even
more pragmatic sense in light of the U.N. efforts, or lack
thereof, outside of the Security Council to combat terrorism.31
This is best exemplified by the work in General Assembly, where
disputes over the definition of terrorism have left negotiations
on a draft comprehensive convention against international ter-
rorism at a standstill for the past thirty-two years.32 In addition,
when the Council adopted Resolution 1373, only two States were
party to all twelve of the existing international conventions and
protocols related to terrorism that were negotiated and con-
cluded in the General Assembly and other U.N. bodies.33 In
30. See DAVID CORTRIGHT ET AL., AN ACTION AGENDA FOR ENHANCING THE UNITED
NATIONS PROGRAM ON COUNTER-TERROISM 12 (Fourth Freedom Forum, Sept. 2004)
available at http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/ActionAgenda.pdf [hereinafter
FOURTH FREEDOM FORUM REPORT]; see also Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373
and the Counter-Terrorism Committee: The Cornerstone of the United Nations Contribution to the
Fight Against Terrorism, in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORiSM 603, 615-17 (2004) [hereinafter Rosand, Cornerstone of the United Nations]; Ros-
tow, supra note 25, at 484-85.
31. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, Focus: September 11, 2001 -
Legal Response to Terror: An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 11
(2002) (stating that as of September 11, 2001, "much of the international law governing
terrorism has been patchy and often ineffective. The specific conventions only ban one
technique and have not been uniformly respected. The broader [U.N. General Assem-
bly] declarations have no binding legal force.").
32. For summaries of the negotiations held in 2004 on the conventions, see Mea-
sures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Working Group, U.N. GAOR, 59th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/59/L.10 (Oct. 8, 2004); see also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/59/37 (2004); Rostow, supra note 1, at 480; Slaughter & Burke-White,
supra note 31, at 10.
33. On September 28, 2001, only Botswana and the United Kingdom were parties
to all twelve international treaties related to terrorism. These treaties are the 1999 In-
ternational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the 1997
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the 1991 Conven-
tion on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, the 1988 Proto-
col for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, the 1988 Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, the 1980 Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 1979 International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the 1971 Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the
1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the 1963
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fact, the Terrorist Financing Convention, the most recent of
these treaties, did not yet have enough parties to have entered
into force.3 4 Moreover, none of the existing instruments con-
tains a mechanism to monitor State parties' efforts to implement
them. Thus, the need for the Council to step in - to establish a
set of global counter-terrorism norms and to create a committee
to work with States to help them implement such norms - was
apparent. This is particularly so if the United Nations, and in
particular the Security Council, is serious about tackling the
global terrorist threat to international peace and security.
The Council's adoption of Resolution 1540 should also be
welcomed as a pragmatic use of its authority to address another
critical, global threat. Only a few months prior to the adoption
of Resolution 1540, the 191 Member General Assembly called
upon States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery and urged States to strengthen their domestic infra-
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. See In-
ternational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res.
54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (2000), reprinted in 39
I.L.M. 270 (2000) [hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention]; International Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1997); Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explo-
sives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, U.S. Treaty No. 103-8, U.N. Doc. S/
22393, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 721; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 304; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080,
1456 U.N.T.S. 1987; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted
Dec. 12, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 206; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 168; Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564,
974 U.N.T.S. 178; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 106; Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered
into force Dec. 4, 1969). All twelve conventions are available at http://untreaty.un.
org/English/Terrorism/Convl2.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
34. As of September 28, 2001, only five countries were parties to the Convention,
17 fewer than the required 22. See Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 33, at
271. Pursuant to Article 26 of the Convention, the Convention "shall enter into force
on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations." Id.
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structure to this end.3 5 Resolution 1540 could be viewed partly
as the Council's attempt to stimulate these international efforts.
It is also generally recognized that there is a gap in the ex-
isting non-proliferation regimes. The relevant instruments -
the Chemical Weapons Convention,36 the Non-Proliferation
Treaty,37 and the Biological Weapons Convention s - are gener-
ally viewed as not dealing with this potential of non-State actors
acquiring WMD in the necessary detail.39 Thus, as it did in
adopting Resolution 1373, the Council acted to fill this gap so as
to address this pressing threat. It adopted a resolution under
Chapter VII that imposes a series of obligations on all States and
creates a monitoring committee to work with them to help en-
sure that they implement them. It would take many years to ne-
gotiate a multilateral treaty in this area and convince all States to
become parties to it; given the urgent nature of the threat, that
inevitable delay makes Resolution 1540 a welcome practical re-
sponse to a pressing problem.
Despite their contributions to the U.N. efforts to address
the preeminent threats of the new century, these Council resolu-
tions have nevertheless been the subject of much criticism and
debate, which center on the role of the Security Council under
the U.N. Charter system in addressing such threats in the twenty-
first century.
II. CONSISTENT WITH THE U.N. CHARTER?
From the above discussion, it appears that a strong case can
be made the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1373 and
Resolution 1540 were sensible responses to serious, critical
35. See G.A. Res. 58/48, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 71st mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/58/
PV.17 (2003).
36. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, G.A. Res. 47/39, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., 74th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/39, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993)
[hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
37. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
38. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 26
U.S.T. 571, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (1972) [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention].
39. See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (pro-
viding statements by Representatives of nearly all 15 Members of the Security Council
and some 20 non-Council Members at a Security Council public meeting to discuss a
draft of what became Security Council Resolution 1540).
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threats. Whether they were consistent with the U.N. Charter and
within the Security Council's mandate, is, however, another
question. The question is pressing in light of the criticism that
the Council, in assuming this "global legislating" function -
which critics claim was not assigned under the Charter - has in
fact acted contrary to the Charter.40 Whether or not this is
viewed as a legitimate innovation or an ultra vires exercise of the
Council's powers could have an impact on States' willingness to
implement the obligations imposed by these resolutions.
The debate over whether the Council has the power to act
as a "global legislator" is the most recent in a long line of debates
over the scope of the Council's powers under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, which authorizes it to adopt measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security." Since the end of
the Cold War, the question of whether there are any political
and legal limits on the exercise of the Council's Chapter VII au-
thority has received much attention. Part II will seek to answer
this question by trying to place this Council activity within the
Charter framework to determine whether the criticisms of the
Resolution 1373 and 1540 are valid.
Article 24, Paragraph 1 of the Charter endows the Security
Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security so as to ensure prompt and ef-
fective action by the United Nations.42 U.N. Members have
agreed that, in carrying out these duties, the Council acts on its
behalf.43 Moreover, it is generally agreed that each U.N. organ is
the judge of its own competence.44 The International Court of
Justice, the Charter's judicial organ, is also given a role here, the
40. See, e.g., Alvarez, Hegemonic, supra note 2, 875 n.9; Happold, supra note 2, at
593; Guillaume, supra note 2, at 540-43; Szasz, supra note 2, at 901.
41. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
43. See id.
44. See Susan Lamb, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers, in THE
REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 361, 363 (Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999); see also Louis Sohn, The U.N. System as Au-
thoritative Interpreter of Its Law, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 203 (Oscar Schachter &
Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1996). But seeJ.A. Frowein & N. Kirsch, Introduction, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 701, 710 (Bruno Simma et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction] (arguing that while every U.N.
organ must, in the first place, determine its own jurisdiction, 'such a determination is
binding only if supported by the Member States in general").
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scope of which remains the subject of much debate,45 although
it is generally agreed that the court lacks the power to find a
Council resolution to be "null and void."46
To enable the Council to fulfill this responsibility effectively
and efficiently, the Charter endows it - under Chapter VII -
with the power to take far-reaching decisions, which are binding
on U.N. Member States. All U.N. Members have not only under-
taken to carry out the decisions of the Council (Article 25) , but
45. Over the last 40 years, the International Court ofJustice ("ICJ") has hinted that
it may have judicial review power over Council resolutions. For example, in the Certain
Expenses case, the Court appeared to reject the idea of judicial review, asserting that
there was no "procedure" in the "structure of the United Nations" for determining the
validity of acts of other organs, and concluding therefore that such organs must, ab
initio, "determine [their] own jurisdiction." Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the
United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 155. In 1971, the Court said that "[u]ndoubtedly,
the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of decisions
taken by the United Nations organs concerned," but nevertheless proceeded to con-
sider such "objections" in its reasoning. See Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Southwest Africa) Not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276, [1971] I.C.J. 16, 45. Some twenty years
later, in the case surrounding the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, the majority of the
court declined to exercise a power ofjudicial review over a Security Council resolution,
but suggested that such a power may exist. Moreover, a number of judges argued in
concurring and dissenting opinions that the ICJ should review the validity of the Coun-
cil resolution. See Provisional Measures Order of April 14, Case Concerning Questions
of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan ArabJamahiriya v. U.S.), [1992] I.C.J. 114, 140; see
also, id., [1992] I.C.J. 114, 156 (concurring opinion of Shahabudden, J.); id. [1992]
I.C.J. 114, 174-75 (dissenting opinion of Bedjaoui, J.); id., [1992] I.C.J. 114, 192-93; id.,
[1992] I.C.J. 114, 196 (dissenting opinions of Weeramantry, J.). For further discussion
of the power of the ICJ vis A vis the Security Council, see THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO
FORCE: STATE AcTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATrACKS 5 (2002) [hereinafter
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE]; Marcella David, Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the
Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court, 40 HARv. INT'L. L. J. 81, 144
(1999) (addressing the possibility of having an international court review the legality of
Security Council resolutions); Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal's Development of Limits on the Security Council's Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 10
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 509, 524 (1996); Kirgis, supra note 11, at 519; T.D. Gill, Legal and
Some Political Limitations on the Power of the United Nations Security Council to Exercise its
Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 33, 37 (1995).
46. SeeJose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1996); see
also W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
83, 93 (1993) (noting that it would not be easy for the Court to find judicially managea-
ble standards to review the Security Council's exercise of its authority under Chapter
VII). But c.f, Babback Sabahi, The ICJ's Authority to Invalidate the Security Council's Deci-
sions Under Chapter VII: Legal Romanticism or the Rule of Law, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 1
(2004) (arguing that the ICJ possesses the authority to invalidate the Council's resolu-
tions under Chapter VII, but has so far abstained from exercising it).
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
554 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:542
they have also agreed to carry out such decisions that are for the
maintenance of peace and security (Article 48, Paragraph 1).41
Before the Council can utilize its powers under Chapter VII,
however, it must determine, pursuant to Article 39, that there is
a situation involving a threat to international peace and secur-
ity,49 and the measures the Council takes under Chapter VII
must be aimed at removing the threat by ending that situation.5 °
The Council has broad discretionary power in making this deter-
mination.51 While the "threat to the peace" concept in Article
39 was drafted to refer to threats created by inter-State conflicts,
the Council quickly broadened this narrow interpretation and
now applies it to intra-State conflicts.5 2 Council practice over the
past fifteen years, where it has exercised its Chapter VII authority
in internal national conflicts - such as those of Albania, Angola,
Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, East Timor, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and Sudan - indicates wide acceptance that the con-
cept of "threat to the peace" now encompasses both inter and
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 48, 1.
49. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter, the Council
may also act under Chapter VII if it determines the existence of a breach of the peace
or an act of aggression. This Article, however, will only address Council action in re-
sponse to a "threat" to the peace; in adopting both of the resolutions that are the focus
of this Article, the Council was responding to a "threat." See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3,
at 1 (stating in the opening sentence that the Security Council affirmed "that prolifera-
tion of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to international peace and security"); see also S.C. Res. 1373, supra
note 3, at I (asserting in the third paragraph that "any act of international terrorism...
constitute[s] a threat to international peace and security").
50. See Happold, supra note 2, at 603.
51. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 5
(2004); see also Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 705; King, supra note 45,
at 517; Keith Harper, Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act As
Court and Legislature?, 27 N.Y.U. J. IN'T'L L. & POL. 103, 105 (1994).
52. In determining the existence of a threat to international peace and security,
the Council is not limited by either the text or negotiating history of the Charter. Al-
though some participating in the negotiations of the Charter recommended defining
the terms of Article 39 with greater specificity, it was finally decided that this would limit
the Council's ability to act effectively against a threat to international peace and secur-
ity. See Stromseth, Imperial Security Council, supra note 24, at 42 (writing that the Char-
ter's framers "deliberately left the terms in Article 39 undefined to give the Security
Council flexibility in responding to new threats to the peace that might emerge"); see
also Happold, supra note 2, at 600; J.A. Frowein & N. Kirsch, Article 39, in THE CH-ARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 717, 722, 726 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d
ed., 2002); Harper, supra note 51, at 149.
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intra-State conflicts. 53 In the post-September 1 1th world, includ-
ing through the adoption of Resolutions 1373 and 1540, the con-
cept of "threat to the peace" has been further expanded to en-
compass global threats posed by non-State actors such as ter-
rorists and terrorist organizations. This broadening of the
Council's view of what constitutes a "threat to international
peace and security" has resulted in a corresponding broadening
of the types of measures it has chosen to impose on States in an
attempt to address the threat.5 4
Article 41 of the Charter states that the Council "may decide
what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions" and then provides an
illustrative list of possible measures.55 According to Oscar
Schachter and others, the language in Article 41 is broad
enough to cover any type of action not involving the use of force,
which is addressed in Article 42.56 As the Appeals Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
has stated, the Article provides "a negative definition ... It only
prescribes what measures cannot be taken." 57 Thus, once the
Council determines that a particular situation poses a threat to
peace and security, it has broad discretion to choose the proper
course of action. The need for the Council to take efficient ac-
tion reinforces this view. 8
53. But see DE WET, supra note 51, at 150-75 (arguing that in all of these instances,
except Somalia, the potential involvement of neighboring countries in the internal con-
flict, or humanitarian crisis, was a concrete risk and that this was a significant factor in
helping the Council find the existence of an threat to "international peace and secur-
ity").
54. See, e.g., Stromseth, Imperial Security Council, supra note 24, at 42; A. Paulus,
Article 29, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 539, 548-62 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Paulus, Article 29].
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
56. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1988); see also,
Happold, supra note 2, at 594; J.A. Frowein & N. Kirsch, Article 41, in THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 735, 740 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed., 2002)
[hereinafter Frowein & Kirsch, Article 41]. But cf. Gaetano Arrangio-Ruiz, On the Security
Council's "Law-Making", 83 RiviSTA DI DipiTro INTERNAZIONALE 609, 723 (2000) (arguing
that "for such a sweeping statement to be legally exhaustive it must be complemented
by another general qualification, which applies to the whole of Chapter VII, including
Articles 41 and 42," namely that Chapter VII measures must be "peace-enforcement mea-
sures rather than law-enforcing, law-making or law-determining measures.").
57. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-AR72, [1995] Int'l Crim. Trib. For Fmr. Yugo-
slavia (Appeals Chamber), reprinted in [1996] 35 I.L.M. 32, 44.
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
556 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:542
The Council's powers under Chapter VII are broad and sub-
ject to few express limitations. 59 Article 24(2) imposes the main
constraint on Council activity, stating that the Council must act
in accordance with the "Principles and Purposes of the United
Nations," which are listed in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter.6"
These include the promotion and respect for human rights, the
development of friendly relations among Nations, and respect
for the sovereign equality of all States. 61 Two significant "princi-
ples and purposes," however, explicitly do not apply to the
Council when acting under Chapter VII: the principle that re-
stricts the United Nations "from intervening in matters which
are essentially with the domestic jurisdiction of any State" (Arti-
cle 2 (7))62 and the need to act "in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law" (Article 1 (1)).6 If applicable,
this latter principle would considerably limit the Council's op-
tions under Chapter VII. However, a close reading of Article
1 (1) of the Charter reveals that this limitation only applies to the
Council's activity under Chapter VI, i.e., when it exercises its dis-
pute settlement powers.6 4 Therefore, the measures the Council
seeks to impose to address threats to peace and security need not
be consistent with existing international law and may touch
upon issues of largely domestic concern. As a further indication
of the freedom of action and power given to the Council under
the Charter, Article 103 makes clear that States' obligations
under the Charter prevail over conflicting treaty obligations.6"
59. See Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 707; see also Lamb, supra
note 44, at 370-74; LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS, 267-69 (3d ed. 1969) (noting that the Charter text and
the traveaux preparatoire make it clear that the Council is given broad discretion in exer-
cising its Chapter VII powers); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 96, 275,
295 (1951).
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 2.
61. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-2.
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
64. See Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 710; see also Bemd
Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International Court, and Judicial Review: What Lessons
from Lockerbie, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 517, 545 (1999); Lamb, supra note 44, at 370; HANS
KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294 (1950).
65. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103. It is also widely accepted that Charter obligations
prevail over conflicting obligations under customary international law. See, e.g., DE WET,
supra note 51, at 182; Alvarez, War on Terrorism, supra note 11, at 132; Harper, supra note
51, at 132. Some assert, however, that the Security Council may not adopt measures
that would violate principles of jus cogens (i.e., peremptory norms of international law).
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In addition to respecting the relevant Charter "purposes
and principles," the Council's behavior is also limited by the
"proportionality principle," under which the Council's action
must be appropriate and necessary for the achievement of its
stated purposes - generally, the removal of the threat to peace
and security - and may not disproportionately affect other inter-
ests.66 Thus, Chapter VII measures may violate the Charter if
their impact is clearly out of proportion to the aims pursued.
Some, in fact, argue that very far-reaching powers are con-
ferred upon the Council on the condition that it confine its ac-
tivities to short-term measures limited to preliminary effects,
leaving a definitive settlement of the conflict to the parties.6 7 As
soon as the targeted State has complied with the measures so
that the threat to peace and security has dissipated, the measures
imposed by the Council are to be terminated or removed.6" Fur-
thermore, some scholars have qualified the broad Council Chap-
ter VII powers by stating that the Council can only adopt peace-
enforcing measures rather than law-making, law-enforcing, or
law-determining measures.69 Although these limitations are not
in the Charter's text, and have not been evidenced by Council
See, e.g., DE WET, supra note 51, at 180; Lamb, supra note 44, at 370; King, supra note 45,
at 562. Judge Eliau Lauterpacht articulated this position in his separate opinion in the
Bosnia case. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), [1993]
I.C.J. 1, 440 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.).
66. See generally Georg Nolte, Article 2(7), in THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: A COM-
MENTARY 148, 171 (Bruno Simma eds., 2d ed. 2002); Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction,
supra note 44, at 711; Kirgis, supra note 11, at 517. The more the Security Council
acquires a constitutional function, the more the principle of proportionality ought to
gain currency as a general limitation of U.N. actions. See Nicolas Angelet, International
Law Limits to the Security Council in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
72 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al. eds., 2001). But see DE WET, supra note 51, at 184-85
(arguing that the freedom of the Council "to choose a combination of measures under
Chapter VI and/or VII to be adopted for the maintenance of international peace and
security already indicates that it is not bound by a general principle of proportionality."
Requiring the Council to exhaust all non-binding or non-military enforcement mea-
sures before authorizing the use of force would not be consistent with the need to give
the Council sufficient flexibility to act quickly and efficiently.).
67. See Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 705. But see Arrangio-Ruiz,
supra note 56, at 637-82.
68. See Happold, supra note 2, at 602. But see Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra
note 44, at 714 (noting "particular problems that have arisen with respect to termina-
tion of Chapter VII measure"); David Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the
Security Council, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993) (highlighting the difficulties in terminat-
ing Chapter VII measures).
69. See Arrangio-Ruiz, supra note 56, at 723-24.
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practice since 1990, these limitations are consistent with the
widely-held view that the Security Council serves as the global
police in the U.N. structure, with the General Assembly man-
dated to recommend longer-term prescriptions for generally ad-
dressing international peace and security.7" In short, the long-
held view has been that the Council responds to specific situa-
tions and the General Assembly acts prospectively.7" The Coun-
cil, it is argued, does not have a mandate to enunciate future
rules of general conduct for an indefinite period of time - what
this Article refers to as "global legislation" - as in fact it did in
both Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1540.72 Rather, the Coun-
cil must restrict itself to addressing the particular situation, with
a temporary, case-related reaction. This interpretation, it is ar-
gued, is supported by the types of measures explicitly mentioned
in both Articles 41 and 42, e.g., "complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations."
7
To summarize briefly, in acting under Chapter VII, the
70. See U.N. CHARTER art. 11, 1 (providing that "[t]he General Assembly may
consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of peace and secur-
ity... and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members
or to the Security Council or to both."); see also Martii Koskenniemi, The Police in the
Temple - Order, Justice and the U.N.: A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325 (1995);
Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 708. According to some, this view is
implicit in the division of functions in the Charter between the Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly:
[t]he Charter - on the assumption that the General Assembly was the organ
of deliberation and the Council an organ of action - defined in considerable
detail the functions and powers of each, emphasizing the primary responsibil-
ity of the Council for making specific decisions to maintain or restore peace
and security, and the responsibility of the General Assembly to develop and
recommend general principles of co-operation for strengthening peace and
security.
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 59, at 11.
71. See Happold, supra note 2, at 600 (noting that the Council "cannot legislate to
prevent threats from arising"); see also Alvarez, Hegemonic, supra note 2, at 874.
72. See Happold, supra note 2, at 608; see also Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra
note 44, at 708-09; Arrangio-Ruiz, supra note 56, at 629; Michael Wood, The Interpretation
of Security Council Resolutions, MAX PLANCKY.B. U.N. L. 77 (1998). The only reference to
"legislation" in the Charter is found Article 13, which provides that the General Assem-
bly "shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: (a) . . . en-
couraging the progressive development of international law and its codification." U.N.
CHARTER art. 13, 2. Under this authority, the General Assembly has adopted dozens
of treaties in numerous fields of international law.
73. Arrangio-Ruiz, supra note 56, at 629. See Karl Zemanek, Is the Security Council the
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Council can make recommendations or decisions relating to a
particular situation or dispute. In exercising this latter function,
it is generally accepted that that Council may impose obligations
(which under Article 103 prevail over any conflicting treaty, and
presumably customary law, and obligations); it may reaffirm
and/or apply existing rules; and it may depart or override such
rules. Furthermore, there appears to be no legal limitation in
the Charter that prohibits the Council from using its Chapter
VII authority in a legislative capacity."4 Again, a traditional ca-
veat to all of the above concepts has been that the Council may
only do so in discrete cases, involving a specific threat to peace
and security.75 However, to continue to read such a limitation
into the Charter at a time when the most urgent threats to inter-
national peace and security are limited by neither time nor geog-
raphy would prevent the Council from fulfilling its responsibility
under the Charter to maintain international peace and security
through "prompt and effective action."
To argue that the Charter provides the Council with the
principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security, grants it broad discretion both to determine the exis-
tence of threats to peace and security and determine the means
for addressing such threats, but does not grant a mandate to im-
pose binding obligations of a legislative character on all States
begs the following question: What if, in order to address a threat
effectively, the Council determines that imposing binding obli-
gations on all States to criminalize certain activity and increase
Judge of Its Own Legality, in LIBER AMICORUM MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI 629, 636-37 (Emile
Yakpo & Tahar Boumedra eds., 1999).
74. See Alvarez, Hegemonic, supra note 2, at 874; see also Szasz, supra note 2, at 904;
Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 709; Kirgis, supra note 11, at 520;
Harper, supra note 51, at 149.
75. See Happold, supra note 2, at 599; see also Lavalle, supra note 2, at 421 (arguing
that the authors of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter did not intend to provide collective
security in instances where State action "if at all present, [is] only a secondary element"
of the threat" and that the measures under Article 41 of the Charter are to apply only to
[S]tates.)"; Nicolas Angelet, International Law Limits to the Security Council, in UNITED
NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 71, 77 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al. eds.,
2000). Writing a few years before the Security Council entered its so-called "legislative"
phase, the British Foreign Office Legal Adviser wrote that while the Council has some
attributes of a legislature, "it is misleading to suggest that the Security Council acts as a
legislature, as opposed to imposing obligations on States in connection with particular
situations or disputes... but it does not lay down rules of general application." Wood,
supra note 72, at 77. The United Kingdom, of course, voted in favor of the adoption of
both Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540.
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domestic capacities to combat the threat is necessary? (The situ-
ation facing the Council when it adopted Resolutions 1373 and
1540.) Presumably, if the Council thought that the lack or weak-
ness of existing counter-terrorism or counter-proliferation legis-
lation and regulations in a particular country posed a specific
threat to peace and security, few would question its authority
under Chapter VII to adopt a resolution requiring that State to
take certain steps to enhance its capacity. It is also difficult to
dispute the fact that the existing terrorist and counter-prolifera-
tion threats are global in nature, and thus, require global re-
sponses. Imposition of such requirements was not a propor-
tional response to the threat. Thus, it would be logical for the
Council to claim the authority under Chapter VII to impose
these same requirements on all States.
III. SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE: THE EXERCISE OF ITS
"LEGISLATIVE" AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF
THE U.N. CHARTER
Given the Cold War paralysis in the Council that prevented
it from addressing the most serious threats to international
peace and security, discussion surrounding the scope of the
Council's authority remained largely academic during the first
45 years of its existence.76 At this time, the Council adopted
Chapter VII enforcement measures to respond to a threat to or
breach of international peace and security on only two occa-
sions: imposing economic sanctions against the racist minority
regime in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 and military sanctions
against the apartheid regime of South Africa in 1977.7" Since
1990, however, the Council has used its Chapter VII powers on a
regular basis, adopting more than 250 Chapter VII resolutions
and a wide range of enforcement measures.78
During the past fourteen years, with the Cold War over and
76. See King, supra note 45, at 509.
77. The Security Council-imposed embargo against the racist regime in Southern
Rhodesia was lifted in 1979 and the arms embargo against apartheid South Africa re-
mained in place until 1994. See DE WET, supra note 51, at 1; see also Frowein & Kirsch,
Article 41, supra note 56, at 738; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO ILLE-
GAL ACTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE QUESTION OF SOUTH-
E, RHODESIA 423-663 (1990).
78. See Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUN-
CIL tbl. 13 (3d ed. 1998) (listing Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter
VII); see also Rome U.N. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 14.
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the P5 deadlock broken, the debate surrounding the scope of
the Council's powers under Chapter VII has assumed practical
significance, as the Council has adopted a wide variety of en-
forcement measures. These measures have ranged from exten-
sive economic embargoes, the authorization of States and re-
gional organizations to use force, the demarcation of a'bound-
ary, the creation of a claims commission, the creation of ad hoc
tribunals, the creation of civil administrative authorities to ad-
minister territories, the imposition of targeted financial, arms,
and travel sanctions, to the adoption of the measures that are
the subject of this Article, namely, the imposition of binding ob-
ligations on all Member States. v9 Article 41 of the Charter has
generally provided the legal basis for this Council activity.80 As
noted in Part II of this Article, in the post-Cold War era, the
notion of a "threat to the peace" has undergone considerable
change, particularly with respect to internal situations.8 ' Many
of the Council's innovative enforcement measures under Article
41 were adopted to address these new threats. In a number of
these instances, the Council imposed binding obligations on one
or more States, which has been characterized by some as the ex-
ercise of the Security Council's legislative authority.
Part III will discuss the resolutions the Council adopted
prior to September 2001 that have been described as legislative
in nature, some of which imposed binding obligations on all
States. It will focus on the Council's establishment of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"),
which, prior to the adoption of Resolution 1373 in September
2001, constituted arguably the most innovative and far-reaching
use of the Council's Chapter VII authority. Moreover, many of
the same concerns surrounding the Council's decision to create
the tribunal, which centered on whether the Council was legis-
lating or law-making, were echoed when the Council adopted
79. See generally DAVID M. MALONE, THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD
WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY (2004) (discussing the Security Council's activity under
Chapter VII since 1990). See David Malone, The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era:
A Study in the Creative Interpretation of the U.N. Charter, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L POL. 487 (2003);
see alsoJ.A. Frowein "c N. Kirsch, Chapter VII. Action with respect to Threats to the Peace and
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Agression, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 701-806 (2d ed. 2002).
80. See U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
81. See supra pt. II.
562 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:542
Resolutions 1373 and 1540.82 Part III will conclude that these
two post-September 11th resolutions are qualitatively different
from previous resolutions. The manifestations of the difference,
however, serve to highlight the innovative rather than the ulta
vires nature of this activity.
A. Previous Security Council "Legislative" Practice
The Security Council has exercised its legislative power on a
number of occasions to address threats to international peace
and security posed by State or State-sponsored terrorism, which,
prior to September l1th, was the focus of the Council's anti-ter-
rorism efforts. For example, when Libya failed to renounce ter-
rorism and respond to the Council's request to extradite those
suspected of being responsible for the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103, the Council obligated Libya to surrender the sus-
pects.8 3 The Council took this action despite the fact that the
demand was in conflict with Libya's existing multilateral treaty
obligations, which are based on the principle aut dedere autjudi-
care.4 At the time, this Council decision was perhaps the clear-
est illustration of its legislative activity. Not only did it create new
obligations for a State, but it did so in direct conflict with a bind-
ing multilateral treaty obligation that addressed the specific is-
sue, and to which most Council members and Libya were par-
ties. 5 Additionally, the Council used its Chapter VII authority to
impose sanctions against Libya, and in doing so, required all
States to take a series of measures against the Government of
Libya and its officials.8"
The Council subsequently adopted similar approaches in
the cases of both Afghanistan and Sudan, subjecting each to en-
82. See Happold, supra note 2, at 596; see also Lamb, supra note 44, at 376-79; Kirgis,
supra note 11, at 524; Harper, supra note 51, at 126.
83. See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/748 (1992).
84. See id. 1. Libya was a party to the Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, under which Libya was obligated to
prosecute or extradite an "alleged offender." See Montreal Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, art. 7, 24
U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
85. See Happold, supra note 2, at 596; see also Kirgis, supra note 11, at 515; Harper,
supra note 51, at 126-29.
86. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 83, 1 4-6 (stating that the Council required all
Member States to impose diplomatic, arms, and economic sanctions on Libya for its
support of terrorist activity).
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forcement measures for their failure to comply with earlier
Council requests to extradite terrorist suspects for trial.87 In
each instance, however, not only did the Council impose bind-
ing obligations on the non-complying State, but on all other
States as well.88
Perhaps the most controversial, yet innovative, exercise of
the Council's Chapter VII powers prior to September l1th was
its decision to establish an ad hoc criminal tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia to prosecute those responsible for committing
serious violations of international humanitarian law.89 In doing
so, it also adopted a statute deciding both the substantive and
procedural rules to be applied by the Court.9 ° The legitimacy of
this Council action was the subject of much debate, focusing
mainly on whether, in establishing the tribunal and adopting the
statute, the Council, a political organ, was exercising judicial
and/or legislative functions which it arguably did not possess.91
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY concluded that the
Council did have the authority under Article 41 to establish the
Court, thus reinforcing the Secretary-General's position.9 2 The
Secretary-General's conclusion was based on two important fac-
87. SeeS.C. Res. 1054, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3660th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1054
(1996) (requiring all States to impose diplomatic and travel sanctions against the Gov-
ernment of Sudan and its officials); see also S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4051st mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1267 (1999) (requiring all States to impose aviation and
financial sanctions against the Taliban).
88. See id.
89. See Happold, supra note 2, at 596; see also Arrangio-Ruiz, supra note 56, at 722;
Harper, supra note 51, at 126-29. The Council followed this precedent when it estab-
lished the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg. U.N. Doc. S/955 (1994).
90. See Statute of International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704/An-
nexes (1993); see also Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. Annex, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
91. See Arrangio-Ruiz, supra note 56, at 722; see also Lamb, supra note 44, at 376.
92. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-AR72, [1995] Int'l Crim. Trib. For Fmr.
Yugoslavia (Appeals Chamber), reprinted in [1996] 35 I.L.M. 32, 44-45 (Jan. 1996); see
also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report]
(reporting on aspects of establishing an international tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia).
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tors. First, that the Council did indeed have the authority under
Chapter VII, as it was acting in response to a particular situation
constituting a threat to international peace and security, and the
measure was aimed at restoring the peace by ending the threat.93
Second, by assigning the tribunal the task of prosecuting persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law, the Council would not be creating or purporting to "legis-
late" that law.9 4 Rather, the tribunals would have the task of ap-
plying existing international humanitarian law." The tribunal
was empowered to apply only those provisions of international
humanitarian law that were clearly part of customary interna-
tional law.
The Secretary-General's report, however, did not address
some of the potentially far-reaching implications of certain pro-
cedural provisions of the ICTY Statute, which the Council an-
nexed to the resolution establishing the ICTY. Such provisions
could be viewed as "legislative," as they establish new rules that
have required some States to change their domestic legal pro-
cess. One commentator has referred to them as "directives to
national governments."96
For example, States are to cooperate with the tribunal and
give effect to its requests for judicial assistance.97 Thus, States
must stay or defer domestic criminal proceedings for cases fall-
ing within the ICTY'sjurisdiction when requested by the ICTY to
do so.98 In addition, an ICTYjudgment is a bar to subsequent
prosecution or retrial before national courts.99 Such require-
ments impose significant limitations on States' judicial sover-
eignty and, in a number of instances, necessitate implementing
domestic legislation.
Finally, the Statute obliges "host" or "transit" States to give
effect to orders issued by the ICTY for the surrender of ICTY
indictees. 1°° This Council-imposed obligation limits such States'
93. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 92, 57.
94. See id. 29.
95. See Happold, supra note 2, at 596, 603; see also Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction,
supra note 44, at 709; Lamb, supra note 44, at 376; Kirgis, supra note 11, at 523.
96. Kirgis, supra note 11, at 524.
97. See ICTY Statute, supra note 90, art. 29.
98. See ICTY Statute, supra note 90, art. 9; see also ICTY, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Feb. 11, 1994, as amended Feb. 11, 2005, R. 10.
99. See ICTY Statute, supra note 90, art. 10.
100. See ICTY Statute, supra note 90, art. 29; see also Daphna Sharga & Ralph Zack-
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ability to exercise universal jurisdiction over those suspected of
committing crimes against humanity or war crimes."' 1
In the Security Council meeting at the adoption of Resolu-
tion 827, representatives from a number of Council Members
stressed the unprecedented nature of this initiative, and ex-
plained that their support for it was based on a number of fac-
tors.10 2 These factors included "the very special circumstances
pertaining in the former Yugoslavia"1 °3 and that it was "an excep-
tional step needed to deal with exceptional circumstances,"10 4 as
well as the fact that the Council was not establishing norms of
international law or seeking to legislate. 10 5 Members were well
aware, however, of the burdens the Statute would impose on all
States. Some alluded to the obligations the resolution imposes
on States to establish their own procedures for implementing
their obligations under the Statute. 10 6 As the French Ambassa-
dor stated, "all States are required to cooperate fully with the
Tribunal, even if this obliges them to amend certain provisions
of their domestic law."107 Interestingly, many of these arguments
were to be used more than ten years later to justify supporting
Council Resolution 1540.
Although no Council Member voted against the Resolution,
two made it clear that establishing a tribunal via a Security Coun-
lin, The International Criminal Tibunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1, 2
(1994).
101. See Sharga & Zacklin, supra note 100, at 14.
102. See Statement by Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Permanent Representative of
Brazil, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 34, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.3217 (1993); see also Statement by Representative of Japan, to the United Nations,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993); Statement by
Sir David Hannay, Representative of the United Kingdom, to the United Nations, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993); Statement by Repre-
sentative of Venezuela, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 8,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993).
103. Statement by Sir David Hannay, Representative of the United Kingdom, supra
note 102, at 18.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 19.
106. See Statement by Juan Yanez-Barnuevo, Representative of Spain, to the United
Nations, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 41, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993); see also
Statement by Sir David Hannay, Representative of the United Kingdom, supra note 102,
at 19; Statement by Madeleine Albright, Representative of the United States, to the
United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217
(1993).
107. Statement by Jean-Bernard Merimee, Representative of France, to the United
Nations, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993).
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cil resolution was not their preferred approach, again rehearsing
the same arguments used surrounding the adoption of Resolu-
tion 1540. China argued that to avoid abuse of Chapter VII pow-
ers, a tribunal should be established to prosecute serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law using the traditional in-
ternational law-making method, namely, .the negotiation and
adoption of a treaty. 108 The adoption of the Statute by means of
a Security Council resolution, China cautioned, meant that all
U.N. Members must implement it to fulfill their obligations
under the U.N. Charter.10 9 Brazil agreed, stating that it would
have preferred the initiative to establish a criminal tribunal to
have been brought to the attention of the U.N. General Assem-
bly. 11' Negotiating a multilateral treaty in a more representative
body such as the General Assembly, Brazil pointed out, would
have been the most appropriate method for establishing a tribu-
nal.111 Moreover, at the time when the Security Council was con-
sidering whether to establish the tribunal, various Member States
echoed this sentiment.1 12
As has been pointed out, it would have been technically pos-
sible to adopt a criminal code and establish a tribunal to prose-
cute those responsible for violations of international humanita-
rian law via the adoption of an international treaty.1 3 However,
it would have taken years for States to negotiate, sign, and ratify
such a convention." 4  Given the urgent threat, the Council
108. See Statement by Li Zhaoxing, Representative of China, to the United Na-
tions, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993).
109. See id. It is worth noting that China abstained on Security Council Resolution
955, which established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/955 (1994).
110. See Statement by Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Representative of Brazil, supra
note 102, at 36.
111. See id.; see also, Arrangio-Ruiz, supra note 56, at 720.
112. See Note Verbale from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/25716 (1993). For example, the Netherlands said that the multilateral
treaty was "the most solid legal basis for the establishment of a tribunal." Id. The
Netherlands added, however, that the establishment of the tribunal by the Council
"seems appropriate" under the circumstances, given the "complicated and time-con-
suming process" involved in concluding a treaty. Id. See Note Verbale from the Perma-
nent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25417 (1993).
113. See Sharga & Zacklin, supra note 100, at 2.
114. See Ralph Zacklin, Some Major Problems in the Drafting of the ICTY Statute, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 361 (2004) ("[E]ven if the negotiation and signature stages [of the
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chose the more expedient route, namely adoption by a Security
Council resolution, choosing to forego the more traditional, but
cumbersome, law-making approach.
Only Brazil and China voiced a preference for establishing
the ICTY via the more traditional law-making route, i.e., the Gen-
eral Assembly. Others, however, while supporting Council ac-
tion, urged the General Assembly to continue to work towards
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court
with general jurisdiction so as to obviate the need for the Coun-
cil to establish future ad hoc tribunals.115 This support for paral-
lel action, for the Council to use its Chapter VII powers in re-
sponse to an urgent situation to fill a lacuna in the international
law framework - i.e., the lack of a permanent international
criminal court - and for the General Assembly to negotiate a
treaty to fill the lacuna permanently and for all situations, was to
be echoed during the debates surrounding the adoption of Res-
olution 1540.
B. Resolutions 1373 and 1540 vs. Previous Security Council Practice
The above-cited examples, as well as the numerous arms,
travel, and financial sanctions the Council has imposed on dif-
ferent countries (in addition to those mentioned above) and, in
certain cases, non-State actors, have imposed occasionally far-
reaching obligations on some, and occasionally all, U.N. Mem-
bers. Nevertheless, Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1540 can be
seen as a qualitatively different exercise of the Council's Chapter
VII power. This difference is manifested in a number of ways.
Although it highlights the innovative nature of the Council's ac-
tivity, it does not leave this activity outside the Charter frame-
work.
First, in the above instances, and in fact all prior Security
Council use of its Chapter VII powers, the Council was respond-
ing to a specific situation. In previous cases when the Council
was addressing the threat posed by terrorism, the threat ema-
nated from the failure of a single State to cooperate in the fight
treaty-making process] could be compressed into a relatively short span of time - say,
12 months - ratification to bring the treaty into force could take many years.").
115. See, e.g., Statement by Juan Yanez-Barnuevo, Representative of Spain, supra
note 106, at 41; Statement by Sir David Hannay, Representative of the United Kingdom,
supra note 102, at 17.
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against terrorism. It established the ICTY to address the armed
conflict in a specific region of the world, the former Yugoslavia.
In adopting Resolutions 1373 and 1540, however, the Council
was responding to global threats and offering a global approach
to help address them. Its responses were not merely directed at
a particular terrorist act, but at all future acts of terrorism." 6 As
one critic has written, with Resolution 1373 the Council has
adopted "a series of general and temporally undefined legal obli-
gations binding the member [S]tates[, which] goes beyond the
limits of the Security Council's powers." 1 7 In short, here the
Council is seen as a "global law maker.""
8
Second, by their nature, the sanctions or other obligations
imposed on all States, prior to the adoption of Resolutions 1373
and 1540, were imposed for a limited purpose: to secure compli-
ance with the targeted State. Thus the Resolutions are explicitly
or implicitly time-limited until the purpose is accomplished." 9
For example, the resolution imposing sanctions against the Gov-
ernment of Sudan states that the binding obligations imposed
on all States "shall remain in force until the Council determines
that the Government of Sudan has complied [with the require-
ments in the resolution]. " 2' Although the obligations that the
ICTY Statute imposes on States may constitute legislation in
form, it is in principle limited to a specific, time-limited situa-
tion. Thus, when the threat to the peace that has given rise to
the establishment of the tribunal disappears, the Council will
close the tribunal. As evidence of this, the Council has endorsed
a "completion strategy" for wrapping up the court's work and
shutting it down.' 2 ' Moreover, although in cases such as Iraq,
116. See DE WET, supra note 51, at 172; see also Rosand, Cornerstone of the United
Nations, supra note 30, at 603; Paulus, Article 29, supra note 54, at 553; Report of the
Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, U.N. GA/SCOR, 57th
Sess., Annex 1 at 8, U.N. Doc. A/57/273 - S/2002/875 (2002), available at http://www.
un.org/terrorism/a57273.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
117. Happold, supra note 2, at 607.
118. See Alvarez, War on Terrorism, supra note 11, at 120.
119. See Szasz, supra note 2, at 901.
120. S.C. Res. 1054, supra note 88, 2.
121. See Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 4582d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/21 (2002) (endorsing the ICTY's strategy for complet-
ing investigations by the end of 2004, completing all trial activities at first instance by
the end of 2008, and completing all of its work in 2010 as outlined in the Report on the
Judicial Status of the ICTY and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National
Courts, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678); see also Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Corn-
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the former Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone, the Council-imposed
sanctions were in force for years, once the Council determined
that the reasons underlying the sanctions no longer existed, the
sanctions were removed. 122 Neither Resolution 1373 nor Resolu-
tion 1540 contains an explicit or implicit time limitation. Pre-
sumably, they will remain in force until the global threats to
which they are responding disappear. Given the nature of the
terrorist threat and the threat posed by the proliferation of
WMD, however, this could mean decades.
Third, while there is a litany of examples where the Council
imposed obligations on States, sometimes requiring them to
amend their domestic legislation, in none of them did the Coun-
cil, as it did in Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1540, lay down a
broad set of rules or norms. In the Secretary-General's report
on the establishment of the ICTY the Secretary-General made it
clear that by adopting the ICTY Statute the Council would not
be establishing new laws, but rather restating existing ones.1 23
The same, however, cannot be said with respect these two post-
September 11th resolutions. Here, the Council sought to estab-
lish a new set of legal norms in the area of counter-terrorism and
counter-proliferation respectively. And it did so in areas of law
where it is usually left to States to agree among themselves,
where other international bodies have been working for a num-
ber of years, and which are already governed by extensive multi-
lateral treaty regimes.
C. Resolutions 1373 and 1540 as Leaves on the "Living Tree"
Despite the unique nature of Resolutions 1373 and 1540,
the discretion given to the Council under the Charter, both in
pletion Strategy: Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and their Tribunals, 3J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 82 (2005); David Pimentel, Technology in a War Crimes Tribunal: Recent Experi-
ence at the ICTY, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 715, 717 n.ll (2004).
122. See Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 709.
123. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 92, at 8; see also Zacklin, supra note 114,
at 363. Zacklin states:
[T]he first humanitarian impulse was to use the powers available to the Secur-
ity Council under Chapter VII to legislate for the Tribunal. This impulse,
while understandable, had to be resisted .... To use Chapter VII in order to
legislate for Member [S] tates would have constituted a highly controversial
extension of the Security Council's competence and one which might very
well have called into question the fundamental legal basis of the Tribunal it-
self.
Zacklin, supra note 114, at 363.
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terms of determining the existence of threats to the peace and
the appropriate enforcement measures to address such threats,
appears broad enough to allow for this innovative activity. Dur-
ing its nearly sixty-year life, the notion of what is permissible
under the Charter has evolved as the Council has been forced to
grapple with new threats to international peace and security.
These threats facing the international community are not the
same as they were ten, let alone sixty, years ago, and thus neither
should be the tools available to the Council for addressing
them.' 2 4 Some have criticized the expansion of the Council's
tool-kit as weakening the constitutional integrity of the U.N.
Charter system. 125 Others, however, take a more realistic ap-
proach and view most of the changes as acceptable steps in the
Charter's development as a living document, or what Thomas
Franck, and many others have called a "living tree," 121 which like
the U.S. Constitution, was "deliberately designed by its founders
to have the capacity to meet new threats to peace and secur-
ity." 127 As a "constitution," the Charter must be allowed to de-
velop with the times so as to be able to deal effectively with the
ever-changing international environment in which it operates. 128
124. See Kirgis, supra note 11, at 506.
125. See Arrangio-Ruiz, supra note 56, at 630, 686-88, 700; see also Koskenniemi,
supra note 70, at 338-39.
126. See FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 45, at 5; see also MALONE, supra
note 79, at 487; Sohn, supra note 44, at 169-229; Kirgis, supra note 11, at 506.
127. Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 628, 633 (2003) ("Particularly during the last decade, there has been an evolu-
tion in the Security Council's interpretation of the rules that shows the ability of the
system to adapt. Rigid textualist interpretations of the Charter may well be dead, but it
is not clear that they were ever really alive."). Britain's Lord Halifax highlighted the
importance of providing the United Nations and its members the necessary flexibility
with new situations that could not be foreseen in 1945. Speaking at the San Francisco
Conference, he said, "We all want our Organization to have life.... We want it to be
free to deal with all the situations that may arise in international relations. We do not
want to lay down rules which may, in the future, be the signpost for the guilty and a trap
for the innocent." Lord Halifax, Verbatim Minutes of First Meeting of Commission I,
U.N. Doc. 1006, June 15, 1945, in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, SAN FRANCISCO APRIL 25 - JUNE 26, 1945 529, 537
(1946).
128. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103. The Charter has been described as having "quasi-
constitutional" features, as a result of its almost universal adherence and the fact that it
has primacy over all other treaties. Article 103 provides that "[iun the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Char-
ter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the Charter shall prevail." Id. According to Professor Franck, this shows that the
"drafters intended to create a special treaty different from all others." FRANCK, RE-
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Nowhere has this need been more apparent than in today's
world where perhaps the greatest threat facing us is that posed
by non-State terrorists and terrorist groups having global reach
and perhaps equally global membership.
Although the Charter had been formally amended on only
three occasions during its almost sixty year history, it has proved
itself to be capable of evolving through the interpretative prac-
tice of its organs. 129 There are two prominent examples of this
adaptability involving the Security Council. First, the Council
has interpreted Article 27, Paragraph 3 of the Charter to mean
that an abstention by a Permanent Member of the Council is not
a veto,13 0 even though the text says something quite different,
namely that "[d] ecisions of the Security Council on all matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members.""' This Coun-
cil interpretation, which was confirmed by the International
Court of Justice, has allowed Permanent Members to note their
displeasure with a proposed resolution, without blocking the
Council from adopting it.13 2 There are numerous instances
where an originalist or strict constructionist interpretation of the
Charter would have prevented the Council from taking action to
address a threat to peace and security because of the lack of sup-
port for such action by one or another P5 member.1 33 This oc-
COURSE TO FORCE, supra note 45, at 5. Professor Kirgis has described it as the "constitu-
tion of the world community," one which delegates powers to the various organs it has
established. See Frederic L. Kirgis, U.N. Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A
Constitutional Perspective, by Bardo Fassbender, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 975, 975 (1999) (book
review). As such, the legality of actions by the Security Council and all other U.N.
organs must be judged by reference to the Charter as a "constitution" of delegated
powers.
129. See Thomas Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 607, 614 (2003). For a description of the amendments, see U.N. CHARTER,
Introductory Note. For a thorough discussion of these amendments, the difficulties
inherent in trying to amend the Charter, and how interpretation and practice have
modified the Charter in certain instances, see Carolyn L. Willson, Current Development:
Changing the Charter: The United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 115 (1996).
130. See Wilson, supra note 129, at 118.
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, § 3.
132. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 22, 22 (1971).
133. See FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 45, at 8 n.16 (listing some of the
more than 300 non-procedural resolutions the Council has adopted in which at least
one Permanent Member either abstained or did not participate in the vote).
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curred most famously with the Council's authorization of Opera-
tion Desert Storm in November 1990, despite China's absten-
tion, and most recently with the response to the genocide in
Darfur, where the Council again took action under Chapter VII,
again with China abstaining. 1 4
The Security Council's authorization of peacekeeping oper-
ations around the globe is a second prominent example of how
the Charter has evolved as a result of the interpretative practices
of the Council to allow for activity that could not otherwise be
legitimized by a strict constructionist interpretation of the Char-
ter.'3 5 Nothing in the Charter explicitly authorizes such activity,
yet few would argue these activities have not made significant
contributions to the Council's ability to successfully maintain in-
ternational peace and security. With the adoption of resolutions
such as 1373 and 1540, one could argue that the Charter has
once again evolved to allow the Council to act as a "global legis-
lator" under certain circumstances.1 36 Strong pragmatic and le-
gal arguments can be marshaled in support of giving the Council
authority under the evolving Charter to adopt resolutions, which
134. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/687 (1991);
S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5015th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1556 (2004).
135. See Erik Suy, Is the United Nations Security Council Still Relevant? And Was It Ever?,
12 TUL.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 7, 13 (2004) (stating that the "United Nations, in particular
the Security Council, along with the Secretary-General, has invented and developed the
concept of peacekeeping as a substitute for failing action under chapter VII"); see also
Willson, supra note 129, at 123; Kirgis, supra note 11, at 532, 538; Rosalyn Higgins, Peace
and Security: Achievements and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445, 448 (1995) (noting that
"creative activity" occurred in the Council to maximize the possibilities of Article 24 and
Chapter VII, "even if colloquially referred to as coming under Chapter Six-and-a-half").
According to a leading authority on U.N. peacekeeping, "[tihe technique of
peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United Nations. The Charter does not
mention it. It was discovered, like penicillin. We came across it looking for something
else, during an investigation of the guerrilla fighting in northern Greece in 1947."
Brian Urquhart, The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping, in
NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE ARTISANSHIP & ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY
59, 62 (Alan K. Henrikson ed., 1986).
136. See Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 709. Shortly after the
adoption of Resolution 1373, Professors Frowein and Kirsch wrote that if "States con-
tinue to endorse the exercise of [global] legislative functions by the Council, the origi-
nal Charter conception [limiting the Council's authority to time-limited responses to
specific situations] might undergo significant change, as it has already done in other
areas." Id. In the more than three years since then, the Council has seen unprecedented
levels of cooperation between all States and the Counter-Terrorism Committee
("CTC"), the body charged with monitoring States' implementation of S.C. Resolution
1373, and has unanimously adopted another resolution of this nature, i.e., S.C Resolu-
tion 1540.
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respond to global threats by imposing obligations that establish
legal norms designed to address these threats. 13 7 The Charter
grants the Council broad discretion both to determine the exis-
tence of a threat to peace and security and the measures to ad-
dress such a threat. Given the changing nature of what consti-
tutes such a threat, the Charter has demonstrated its ability to
evolve with the times.1
38
IV. RESOLUTIONS 1373 AND 1540: A WAKE-UP CALL TO
THE TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW-MAKING PROCESS?
A broad construction of the Council's Chapter VII powers
to support its acting as a "global legislator" inevitably raises the
question of Council legitimacy, as it has done whenever the
Council moves into uncharted territory.1 39  In this instance,
there is a central issue: whether it is appropriate for the Coun-
cil, a small and unaccountable political body, whose decisions
are immune from judicial review, to create far-reaching legal ob-
ligations for the entire international community. 4 °
The speed and efficiency of this Council power clearly in-
vites its continued use. The concern expressed by some, how-
ever, is that in addition to falling outside the Council's mandate,
it disrupts the balance of power between the Council and the
General Assembly as enshrined in the Charter and more gener-
137. See Szasz, supra note 2, at 904. But see Happold, supra note 2, at 600 (asserting
that the Council cannot legislate to prevent threats from arising).
138. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, An American Vision of International Law, 97 Am.
Soc'v INr'L L. PROC. 125, 128 (2003) (asserting that the United Nations "must adapt
not only to changing power structures, but also to changing threats and values"); see also
Andreas Paulus, Realism and International Law: Two Optics in Need of Each Other, 96 Am.
Soc'v Iwr'L L. PROC. 260, 272 (noting that the U.N. Charter "must be interpreted in a
way that recognizes both the will of its drafters and changing realities").
139. SeeJ6st Delbrfick, Article 25, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COM-
MENTARY 452, 453 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also Gill, supra note 45, at
36, 126; King, supra note 45, at 510.
140. See Lamb, supra note 44, at 363; see also Sohn, supra note 44, at 203. But see
Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra note 44, at 710 (arguing that while every U.N.
organ must, in the first place, determine its own jurisdiction, "such a determination is
binding only if supported by the Member States in general"); Rome U.N. Conference
Report, supra note 4, at 14; Statement by Gunther Pleuger, Representative of Germany,
to the United Nations, at the General Assembly on the reform of the Security Coun-
cil,U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 26th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.26 (2004), available at
http://germany-un.org/archive/speeches/2004/spO_12_04.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2005) [hereinafter Statement by Ambassador Pleuger].
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ally contravenes the traditional international law-making pro-
cess, which is still based on the consent of States.'41 The Coun-
cil's exercise of this power has been described as circumventing
the "vehicle par excellence of community interest:" the multilat-
eral treaty.14 2 Under the traditional international law regime,
rules of law are binding on States only when they have consented
to be bound either through the negotiation and conclusion of a
treaty or development of customary international law, which
consists of State practice and opinio juris.1 4 3 One could argue,
however, that the requisite consent exists for the Council to act
as a "global legislator." When U.N. Member States adhered to
the Charter they expressly consented to a system in which the
Council - fifteen States - acts on their behalf when carrying out
its duty to maintain international peace and security. This im-
plies their consent to each and every exercise of Council author-
ity.144 More to the point, on ratifying the Charter, all States ex-
pressly consented to a system where this small group of States,
sitting as the Security Council, collectively assumes a formal law-
making role via the adoption of binding resolutions.
145
For some, however, this consent may be too attenuated to
141. See Statements made by Representatives of a number U.N. Member States at
the April 22, 2004 Security Council meeting to discuss a draft of what became Security
Council Resolution 1540, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950
(2004); see also Happold, supra note 2, at 607; Duncan Hollis, Private Actors in Public
International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. Irr'L
& CoMP L. REv 235, 250 (2002) (noting that the "general consent of iS]tates creating
rules of general application remains the operating principle of the international legal
order").
142. Alvarez, Hegemonic, supra note 2, at 874; see also Lavalle, supra note 2, at 418.
But see Szasz, supra note 2, at 901; Paulus, Article 29, supra note 54, at 553 (stating that
although "one may doubt the competence of the Security Council to substitute Chapter
VII measures . . . for the more burdensome avenue of treaty-making, this procedure
may be justified by the special nature of the terrorist threat in the specific case con-
cerned").
143. See Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globilization as a Challenge to International Law, 40
DuQ. L. REv. 655, 656 (2004).
144. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
145. See Michael Byers, Thomas Franck's Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats
and Armed Attacks, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 721, 723 (2003) (book review); see also Statement by
H.E. Ambassador Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of the Principality of
Liechtenstein, supra note 7 (stating that by electing non-permanent Members to the
Security Council, the General Assembly has entrusted these ten States "with handling
issues of international peace and security on their behalf and accepts the relevant deci-
sions as legally binding").
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be sufficient.1 4 6 Instead, it is argued, every affected State. should
have the right to take part in the negotiation of any measure that
creates a binding legal norm. 4 7 It is the General Assembly's role
to fill gaps in existing international law through the negotiation
and conclusion of a treaty.'4 8 Such gaps should not be filled by
the imposition of Security Council measures, which are viewed
by some as unbalanced and selective, as they tend to represent
the views of the most powerful members of the already unrepre-
sentative political body. 49
Leaving it to the General Assembly to agree upon global
norms to address urgent and global threats - while perhaps ap-
pealing in theory and more consistent with the Westphalian con-
ception of the international system - would, however, signifi-
cantly impede the United Nation's and particularly, the Security
Council's ability to deal effectively with the critical threats of the
twenty-first century. With 191 Member States, often represent-
ing different economic and political perspectives, generally eligi-
ble to participate, the traditional treaty-making process in the
General Assembly has become a time-consuming and cumber-
some one.15 ° The prevailing practice of seeking consensus or
146. See Alvarez, War on Terrorism, supra note 11, at 120.
147. See Harper, supra note 51, at 151.
148. See U.N. CHARTER art. 13, 1. Article 13(1) of the Charter provides that
"[t]he General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the pur-
pose of: a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging
the progressive development of international law and its codification." Id.
149. See, e.g., Statement by Representative of Cuba, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th
mtg. at 30, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004); Statement by Vijay Nambiar, Representative of
India, supra note 5, at 23; Statement by Representative of Indonesia, supra note 5, at 31;
Statement by Representative of Namibia, supra note 5, at 17; Statement by Representa-
tive of Nepal, supra note 5, at 14; Statement by Representative of South Africa, supra
note 5, at 21.
150. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1994); see also
John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782, 795 (2003). Jackson questions the legitimacy of the one-Nation, one-vote
system, where a
mini-[S] tate of less than fifty thousand people should carry the same weight in
a voting structure as giant governments and societies that have more than one
hundred million constituents each? Does giving each mini-[S]tate such
weight accentuate the possibilities of "hold-out" bargaining, what some call
.ransom"? Is it fair that a voting majority of U.N. members today could theo-
retically encompass less than 5 percent of the world's population?
Jackson, supra, at 795. See Zacklin, supra note 100, at 362 (explaining the practical disad-
vantages of embarking on a traditional treaty-making exercise when faced with the need
to fill a pressing legal gap).
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near-unanimity to adopt a convention has not only led to drawn-
out negotiations, but also to highly ambiguous or empty provi-
sions, undermining what is needed to ensure the establishment
of an effective international legal regime.151  The ten-year con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, the frustrations at the 1992 Rio
Conference on the Environment, and the stalled negotiations of
the comprehensive terrorism convention and the nuclear terror-
ism convention, where no progress has been made in the last
seven negotiating sessions spanning more than three years, are
just a few examples. 152
Part of the reason why the Security Council had to adopt
Resolution 1373 was because the traditional law-making process
in the General Assembly was not working.' 53 For example, nego-
tiations on a comprehensive terrorism convention have been
stalled for four years over two paragraphs in the text related to
the definition of terrorism. 54 Although there was consensus on
151. See Schachter, supra note 56, at 4.
152. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; U.N. Conference on the Environment and Develop-
ment, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/
Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992); see also Draft Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 166,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1 (2000), Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, Jan. 28, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.252/L.3 (1997); International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 89, 91 (1990). The Convention took nine years to negotiate and still has not
received the necessary 22 instruments of ratification or accession for it to enter into
force. See id. art. 19, 1. Only 16 States signed the treaty and, as of November 1, 2004,
only 19 are parties.
153. It is worth noting that during the Cold War, when the Council was paralyzed
and thus unable to act on most issues, including the use of force, the General Assembly
stepped into the gap. During this period it passed its well-known "law making" resolu-
tions on issues related to the use of force. These included the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (G.A. Res. 2625) and the
1974 Definition of Aggression (G.A. Res. 3314). See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., 1883rd mtg. at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970); G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., 2319th mtg. at 142-43, U.N. Doc. (1974). According to Rosalyn Higgins, "[t]hese
Declarations reflected a determination by the Assembly to act, notwithstanding the
freeze in the Security Council." Higgins, supra note 135, at 447.
154. The two major outstanding issues are both political, rather than legal in na-
ture and center around Articles 18 and 2 of the draft text. The first is a proposed
exclusion from the scope of the convention for the activities of armed forces in an
armed conflict and of State military forces in the conduct of their official duties. The
second is the demand by the Organization of the Islamic Conference ("OIC") (consist-
ing of fifty-five countries) for inclusion of language that would legitimize activities of
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the remaining parts, the text could not be adopted until agree-
ment was reached on all provisions. Even where the General As-
sembly had reached consensus on the text of a counter-terrorism
treaty, States, particularly in the regions where the terrorist
threat is probably greatest, were slow to take the necessary do-
mestic steps to become parties to (i.e., be legally bound by)
them, thus limiting their practical relevance. For example, few
States were parties to the two most recently adopted interna-
tional terrorism conventions, with one of them (the Terrorist Fi-
nancing Convention), not yet in force.1" In fact, only two States
were party to all twelve of the international conventions and pro-
tocols related to terrorism. 156 Moreover, there was no mecha-
nism in place to monitor the efforts of States to join and imple-
ment these treaties. Thus, even where States had consented to
be bound by the obligations contained in the treaties, the
United Nations had limited means to politically pressure them to
actually implement such obligations. In sum, the traditional law-
making approach was proving inadequate for dealing with the
global and imminent terrorist threat. The Security Council,
therefore, may have had little choice but to try to fill the void.
With the Council confronted on one side by these new
threats and on the other by the limitations of the consent-based
international law-making tradition, one is reminiscent of Louis
Henkin's statement a decade ago:
[P]roblems looming for mankind at the turn of the century
cry for regulation but the laws of law-making render regula-
tion difficult to achieve .... The international system remains
essentially "liberal", but some movement towards the welfare
[S]tate might be irresistible .... Should we be thinking of
changing the laws of law-making - as in fact the world did in
national liberation movements and "peoples struggling against foreign occupation." See
Office of Legal Affairs, Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution
51/210 of 17 December 1996, available at http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/index.
html (providing a summary of the recent debates on tis subject in the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee.); see also Oothuizen & Wilmshurst, supra note 27.
155. On September 28, 2001, four States were party to the 1999 Terrorist Financ-
ing Convention. See Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 33. Twenty-eight were
party to the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention. See Terrorist Bombings Convention,
supra note 33.
156. Two States (Botswana and the United Kingdom) were party to all 12 interna-
tional conventions and protocols related to terrorism. See supra note 33 and accompany-
ing text.
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1945 when it established the U.N. Security Council?
157
It appears that the Security Council, through the adoption of
Resolutions 1373 and 1540, has provided at least a partial answer
to Professor Henkin's question: in certain circumstances, per-
haps recognizing the limitations of the "laws of law-making," the
Council will need to make innovative use of its Chapter VII au-




Expansion of Security Council membership to make it more
representative and reflective 6f current political realities will
help allay legitimacy concerns, such as those described above,
when the Council chooses to act as a "global legislator."' 59 Any
such expansion, however, will likely take a number of years.
Meanwhile, given the urgent and global nature of the twenty-first
century threat, the speed and efficiency with which the Council,
as compared with the General Assembly and other more repre-
sentative bodies, can act will no doubt tempt Council members
to continue using the "global legislation" tool as one means to
address these threats. The concern that the Council might
abuse this authority and regularly usurp the role of the General
Assembly"6 ° may be misplaced. Because this process circumvents
the traditional treaty-making process for all U.N. Members, in-
157. See Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEWSL.,(Am.
Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, D.C., Jan. 1994); see also Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Reflec-
tions on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40 STAN. J. INr'L. L. 211, 215 (2004) (stressing
the importance of recognizing the limitations of both the U.N. framework and the sov-
ereignty-centered approach it represents).
158. See Szasz, supra note 2, at 905 (noting that if this Security Council authority is
used prudently, it will enhance the U.N. and benefit the international community,
"whose ability to create international law through traditional processes has lagged be-
hind the urgent requirements of the new millennium").
159. See Delbrack, supra note 139, at 452. The German Permanent Representative
to the United Nations recently said that if the Council was going to continue to "set[ I
rules for the UN-membership as a whole," as it has done with S.C. Resolutions 1373 and
1540, "it is essential to change the structure of the [Security C]ouncil of 1945." State-
ment by Ambassador Pleuger, Representative of Germany, supra note 140, at 18. The
Security Council, he continued, "needs, especially when legislating, more legitimacy
through better representativeness." Id.
160. See, e.g., Lamb, supra note 44, at 388 (writing that the Council's "open-tex-
tured and discretionary powers could be inherently subject to abuse, with profound
consequences for the fundamental rights of [S] tates and individuals bearing the brunt
of such measures").
2005] THE SECURTY COUNCIL AS "GLOBAL LEGISLATOR" 579
cluding the P5, it bypasses the role allocated to domestic legisla-
tures in national systems. Therefore, since each Council Mem-
ber will need to tread carefully so as not to offend its legislative
branch, the Council is likely to use this power sparingly.
When the Council chooses to act as a "global legislator," it
must nevertheless be careful to protect its institutional legiti-
macy by exercising this broad power in ways that most States
deem appropriate and within its competence.161 It must also
have safeguards in place to prevent this power from being
abused and to help ensure broad Member State cooperation and
compliance. Both Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1540 offer
some lessons in this regard that could serve as a guide for future
Council use of its "global legislating" function.
First, the Council should only exercise this power on an ex-
ceptional basis to address a new and urgent threat not addressed
by existing treaty regimes. In both resolutions 1373 and 1540,
the Council was seeking to address gaps in the international law
regimes pertaining to counter-terrorism and counter-prolifera-
tion - both recognized urgent threats. 162 With respect to Reso-
lution 1373, as has already been stated, a web of international
conventions and protocols related to terrorism existed.'63 As
previously noted, however, on the day Resolution 1373 was
adopted only two States were parties to all of them and most of
the instruments had fewer than one-hundred States parties.
16 4
The recently concluded Terrorist Financing Convention had
only four parties, eighteen fewer than needed to bring the con-
vention into force. 165 In fact, the convention would not enter
161. See Rome U.N. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 13-14; see also Alvarez,
Hegemonic, supra note 2, at 888; Happold, supra note 2, at 609 (arguing that, absent cer-
tain safeguards, which would essentially give the General Assembly a veto over Security
Council action in this area, the Council would be usurping the powers of States to
legislate for themselves); Harper, supra note 51, at 105.
162. Even those who questioned the Council's authority to fill the gaps agreed that
the gaps existed. See, e.g., Statement by Vijay Nambiar, Representative of India, supra
note 5; Statement by Representative of Indonesia, supra note 149; Statement by Repre-
sentative of Namibia, supra note 149; Statement by Representative of Nepal, supra note
149; and Statement by Representative of South Africa, supra note 149.
163. See supra note 33.
164. See United Nations Treaty Collection, available at http://untreaty.un.org/En-
glish/Terrorism.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). On September 28, 2001, only Botswana
and the United Kingdom were parties to all twelve of the treaties and only five of the
twelve had more than 100 States parties.
165. See Terrorist Finacing Convention, supra note 33. As of September 28, 2001,
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into force until April 10, 2002, some three and a half years after
the General Assembly began negotiating the text. 16 6 The Gen-
eral Assembly's Sixth Committee was also in the midst of negoti-
ating two additional counter-terrorism treaties, which were (and
remain) stalled. 1 67 There is no indication of when these negotia-
tions might conclude. In short, a glaring gap existed in the in-
ternational law framework to combat terrorism.
With respect to 1540, there were already a number of ex-
isting non-proliferation treaties, which had broad participation
from the vast majority of States. The Council felt, however, that
none of them adequately addressed the specific challenge facing
the United Nations, namely preventing terrorists and terrorist
organizations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction.
168
On two occasions prior to September 11th, the Council con-
fronted an international law gap during its efforts to carry out its
mandate. The first instance, which has been discussed above,
led to the creation of the ICTY and the adoption of the court's
statute.' 6 9 As noted above, the Council chose to use its Chapter
VII authority and forego the traditional international law-mak-
ing approach in order to respond rapidly to the urgent threat to
the peace. 170 Around that same time, following the spate of at-
tacks on U.N. personnel, it was initially suggested that the Secur-
ity Council declare such acts to be international crimes and re-
quire all States to prosecute or extradite those who commit
them. The Council, however, decided to forego the "global leg-
islation" route, leaving it instead for the General Assembly's Le-
Botswana, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan were parties to the conven-
tion.
166. On December 8, 1998, the General Assembly empowered the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee to elaborate a draft of an international convention for the suppression of the financ-
ing of terrorism. See G.A. Res 53/108, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess. 83rd plenary mtg., at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/53/108 1999.
167. See OOSTHUIZEN & WILMSHURST, supra note 27.
168. As of September 2004, there were some 189 parties to the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 151 parties to the Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; and 164 to the 1993 Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction. See OOSTHUIZEN & WILMSHURST, supra note 27, at 6
n.3; see also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 48, 3729 U.N.T.S. 161; Biological Weapons Convention, supra
note 36; Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 36.
169. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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gal Committee to negotiate and adopt what became the U.N.
Convention on the Safety of U.N. and Associated Personnel.'71
Although it is not clear why the Council chose not to act here, it
seems that the threat was not of such an imminent and global
nature to justify Council action. By deferring to the General As-
sembly, the Council gave due respect to the traditional law-mak-
ing approach. The result, however, is that ten years after the
Convention was adopted, fewer than half of the U.N. Member
States are party to the treaty and none of the States parties is a
"host-States," i.e., a State host to a U.N. operation covered by the
Convention. t7 2 Thus, those States whose adhesion is needed to
make the treaty truly effective are not parties to it.
Second, the Council should make every reasonable effort to
ensure that the obligations it imposes on States generally reflect
the will of the international community.173 Resolutions impos-
ing such obligations should be adopted by consensus, as were
both 1373 and 1540, and following some consultation with a
broad range of non-Council Members, as only 1540 was. The
Council's failure to consult broadly prior to the adoption of Res-
olution 1373 was mitigated by the fact that it drew on provisions
of treaties that had been adopted by consensus. Admittedly,
however, these treaties did not yet have universal participation.
In drafting Resolution 1373, the Council took certain provi-
sions from the Terrorist Financing Convention and from other
conventions related to terrorism, and made them binding on all
States overnight in order to fill the existing gap.174 While no
single convention from which the Council borrowed had univer-
sal participation, all of them were adopted by consensus either
in the General Assembly or in one of the U.N. specialized agen-
cies. Moreover, the Council avoided addressing those issues on
which there was no consensus among the wider U.N. Member-
ship. For example, it took care not to interfere with the ongoing
General Assembly efforts to define terrorism, and thus Resolu-
171. See Wood, supra note 72, at 78.
172. See Report of the Secretary-General: Scope of Legal Protection Under the Convention on
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personne4 U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item
152, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/59/226 (2004). As of August 2004, 71 States were party to the
Convention. See id.
173. See, e.g., Rome U.N. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 13; Alvarez, Hege-
monic, supra note 2, at 888; Szasz, supra note 2, at 905.
174. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3.
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tion 1373 allows each State to apply its own definition.1 75
Notably, one of the positive results of Resolution 1373 is the
marked increase in ratifications and accessions to these trea-
ties. 17  This increase is largely due to the technical assistance
that the Counter-Terrorism Committee ("CTC") and other inter-
national and regional bodies have made available to States.
Such support assists States with drafting the often complex, but
necessary, legislation to join treaties and then implement them
in their domestic systems. 177 For many States it therefore ap-
pears that lack of capacity rather than lack of political will or
agreement with the principles contained in the treaties was the
reason for failing to become parties to them.
Although Resolution 1540 does not draw upon provisions of
existing treaties, the Council sought to ensure that the obliga-
tions imposed by Resolution 1540 reflected the will of the inter-
national community. The Council engaged in lengthy negotia-
tions within the Council, consulted with regional groups, and
held a public meeting of the Security Council to hear comments
from the wider U.N. Membership on a draft text.178 While many
criticized the legislative role of the Council during the public
Security Council meeting held six days prior to the adoption of
the Resolution, no one criticized the substance of the actual
measures the Council was seeking to impose on States.179 The
175. The principal reason the Security Council did not attempt to define terrorism
was to avoid the divisive debate that has bogged down the General Assembly Sixth Com-
mittee's work on the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The
sponsors of Security Resolution 1373 wanted a resolution that would pass quickly. One
commentator has gone so far as to say that the resolution "was possible only because
member [S] tates did not have to tackle the issue of terrorism.... Many [S] tates among
those voting for the resolution did not see eye to eye with the United States on such a
definition." Shibley Telhami, Conflicting Views of Terrorism, 35 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 581,
584 (2002) (emphasis added).
176. See FOURTH FREEDOM FORUM REPORT, supra note 30, at 6 (noting that between
September 2001 and May 2004, the Terrorist Bombings Convention has seen the num-
ber of States parties increase from 28 to 115 and the Terrorism Financing Convention
has seen an increase from 5 to 107; in addition, those conventions that address specific
areas of terrorist activity have had a 2040% increase in ratification rates since the adop-
tion of S.C. Resolution 1373).
177. See FOURTH FREEDOM FORUM REPORT, supra note 30, at 11-13.
178. See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004)
(public meeting of the Security Council on April 22, 2004 at which all 15 Council and
more than 30 non-Council Members voiced their views on a draft of what became S.C.
Resolution 1540); see also Lavalle, supra note 2, at 425; OOSTHUIZEN & WILMSHURST,
supra note 27 at 3.
179. See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004).
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Council's legitimacy will be jeopardized if the measures it seeks
to impose are seen as solely reflecting the views of the P5, or
worse, just the single "hegemon."' °
Third, the Council should establish a committee to work co-
operatively with States to implement the "global legislation."
Creating a non-threatening body to work with each country will
serve as the carrot to offset the stick of the Chapter VII measures
and will soften their impact. This approach has been a key to
the success of Resolution 1373 and the CTC, which has received
unprecedented levels of cooperation from States. 181 When the
Council adopted Resolution 1373 and established the CTC to
monitor States' implementation of the provisions therein, it of-
fered little guidance on how the committee should operate and
what role it should play in the efforts to combat terrorism.
While the Council wanted all States to do more domestically to
combat terrorism, it did not envisage the CTC becoming the ex-
traordinary capacity-building instrument that it has become.8 2
As a result of this approach, all States have cooperated with
the committee to one degree or another and none has criticized
the measures imposed under Resolution 1373 as being illegiti-
mate. Largely as a result of the CTC's success in getting States to
take the necessary steps to begin implementing Resolution 1373,
the Council chose to adopt the same approach in Resolution
1540, when it created the 1540 Committee. 83
Fourth, in imposing global norms, the Council should allow
States broad discretion to implement them in ways that are con-
180. See Rome U.N. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 14; see also Alvarez, Hege-
monic, supra note 2, at 888 (noting that the "Security Council would be well-advised to
be sure that what it does reflects the will of the international community as a whole,
including [S]tates not represented on the Council and members of international civil
society.").
181. Hoping to replicate this success, the Council established a similar committee
to monitor the implementation of S.C. Resolution 1540. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3,
1 6.
182. See Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, supra note 25, at 335. The way the
CTC operates (transparently, through dialogue, and by consensus), the role it plays
(seeking to establish a dialogue between the Council and each State on how best to
build its capacity against terrorism), and its focus on developing relationships with in-
ternational, regional, and sub-regional organizations, and on the facilitation of techni-
cal assistance to needy States, have been shaped by both the Council, and the CTC
itself, largely based on the direction provided by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the CTC's first
chairman. See Rosand, Cornerstone of the United Nations, supra note 30, at 615-17 (discuss-
ing the CTC's accomplishments).
183. See supra note 181.
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sistent with their domestic legal systems. This approach will
make these Chapter VII measures seem more like goals or stan-
dards rather than rigid legislative requirements.
This strategy was used in both Resolution 1373 and Resolu-
tion 1540. For example, operative Paragraph 1(b), which re-
quires States to have a law in place that criminalizes the financ-
ing of terrorism, is the only one of the eleven binding
paragraphs in Resolution 1373 that actually requires specific ac-
tion from States.1 84 The remaining ten impose obligations that
allow States considerable flexibility in choosing the means for
implementing them. For example, Paragraph 2(b) requires
States to "take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts" 8 ' and 2(d) requires them to "deny safe haven" to
terrorists and their supporters.1 86 Here the Council is setting
forth the goals, but leaving it to the States to decide how to reach
them. Moreover, rather than imposing a specific template on
States concerning how to implement the requirements under
Resolution 1373, the CTC is relying on the best practices, codes,
and standards in the specific substantive areas of the resolution
developed by broadly representative international organizations
such as the International Civil Aviation Organization and the
World Customs Organizations. 187
The Council followed this same approach in Resolution
1540. For example, the resolution requires that States "adopt
and enforce appropriate effective' laws, "in accordance with their na-
tional procedures,"188 which will prevent terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and
that States "develop and maintain appropriate effective measures"
184. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3, 1 (b).
185. See id. 2(b).
186. See id. I 2(d).
187. See S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5053d mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/1566
(2004) (requesting "the CTC in consultation with relevant international, regional and
sub-regional organizations and the U.N. bodies to develop a set of best practices to
assist States in implementing the provisions of Resolution 1373 (2001) related to the
financing of terrorism"); see also FOURTH FREEDOM FORUM REP RT, supra note 30, at 10
(noting that the CTC has borrowed from other international agencies in establishing
standards for assessing State capacity); Rosand, Cornerstone of the United Nations, supra
note 30, at 618. But see Serge Schmemann, United Nations to Get a U.S. Antiterror Guide,
N.Y. Timas, Dec. 19, 2001, at B4 (reporting that the U.S. Resolution 1373 report to the
Council, indicating a broad range of actions taken under the U.S. PATRIOT Act was
intended as a "template for other countries in adapting their own laws").
188. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis added).
2005] THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS "GLOBAL LEGISLATOR" 585
in the areas of export controls, border controls, and physical
protection of nuclear, chemical and biological materials.189
During the debates surrounding the adoption of Resolution
1540, perhaps anticipating some of the criticism that would be
leveled against the Council for acting as a "global legislator," a
number of Council Members cited the flexibility the Council was
allowing States to implement the provisions of the resolution.
For example, the Spanish Ambassador said that the resolution
"was not intrusive as it gives States leeway on how to internally
interpret its implementation."19 ° The French Ambassador ad-
ded that the Council was simply "establishing the goals, but leav-
ing each State free to define the penalties, legal regulations, and
practical measures to be adopted" to fulfill them.1 ' Pakistan
made it clear that the flexibility the Council allowed States in
implementing the resolution was part of the reason that it could
join other Council Members in supporting the text.192
Fifth, although the Council failed to do this in both 1373
and 1540, in any future attempts at "global legislation" it should
consider highlighting both the emergency nature of the Coun-
cil-imposed measures and recognition that such measures may
be more appropriately addressed in a multilateral treaty negotia-
tion, i.e., via the traditional law-making process. Practically, this
goal could be achieved by including language in the resolution
that provides for regular (e.g., yearly) Council review of the mea-
sures to ensure that they are still needed and that a decision to
terminate the measures would not be subject to the veto.'93 This
review could be coupled with a call on the General Assembly or
another more representative body to begin new or to finalize
ongoing negotiations of a multilateral treaty addressing the is-
sues the Council was forced to address on an emergency basis.
Once such an instrument entered into force, the Council would
then come under great pressure to terminate its measures, if it
189. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
190. Statement by Mr. Arias, Representative of Spain, to the United Nations, U.N.
SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004).
191. Statement by Jean-Marc de La Sabliere, Representative of France, to the
United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004).
192. Statement by Munir Akram, Representative of Pakistan, to the United Na-
tions, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004).
193. See Rome U.N. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 14 (emphasizing the im-
portance that the Security Council clarify that its "legislative" actions are "emergency
regulations" directed at an immediate threat to peace and security.).
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had not already done so, as there would no longer be an interna-
tional law gap that needed filling.'9 4
This parallel approach was advocated not only by a number
of U.N. Members surrounding the adoption of Resolution 1540,
but also some eleven years earlier by Council Members upon the
establishment of the ICTY. While supporting the creation of an
ad hoc tribunal to deal with the exceptional circumstances, Coun-
cil Members urged that work continue on establishing, through
the adoption of a multilateral treaty, a permanent international
criminal court.19 5 Highlighting some of the pitfalls of the tradi-
tional international law-making process, it took another five
years to conclude such a treaty and an additional four years
before it entered into force. 196 Nevertheless, with a permanent
international criminal court now established, there is no interna-
tional law gap for the Council to fill in this area, and thus the
Council is unlikely to establish another ad hoc tribunal.
Finally, the Council should be sensitive to the concern in
the U.N. community that it may be exceeding its mandate by
adopting a Chapter VII resolution imposing "global legislation"
on the entire U.N. Membership. One fear would be that the
Council would then adopt Chapter VII enforcement measures,
including ultimately the authorization of the use of force,
against States that fail to implement the measures contained
therein. To help assuage this fear, the Council should make it
clear in the underlying resolution that any enforcement action
taken against non-compliers would require a second resolution.
194. See Statement by Ndekhedehe Efflong Ndekjedehe, Permanent Representa-
tive of Nigeria, supra note 5 (stating that unless the Council stipulates that these are
emergency regulations to address an imminent threat, perhaps of a time-limited dura-
tion until more legally founded instruments of law can be negotiated or come into
force, the Security Council's legitimacy and authority will almost certainly come under
increasing attacks).
195. See, e.g., Statement by Juan Yanez-Barnuevo, Representative of Spain, supra
note 106, at 7; Statement by Sir David Hannay, Representatives of United Kingdom,
supra note 102, at 17; Statement by Representatives of Venezuela, supra note 102, at 41.
196. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was signed in Rome on
July 17, 1998, and entered into force on July 1, 2002. See Rome Statute on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/189/9,
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998); see also International Criminal Court, Historical Intro-
duction, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ataglance/whatistheicc/history.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005) (describing the history and establishment of the International
Criminal Court).
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From the evolution that took place from Resolution 1373 to Res-
olution 1540, it appears that the Council has already been sensi-
tized to this concern.
In Resolution 1373 the Council determined to "take all nec-
essary steps" to ensure its full implementation. These are buzz
words for using all available means under Chapter VII, including
force, with a subsequent Council resolution not necessarily re-
quired. 9 7 Thus, the Council explicitly stated its readiness to
take steps to deal with those States that are failing to comply with
the Resolution. Including such language in a resolution of this
sort, which depends on broad cooperation from States in order
to be effective, could result in having the opposite effect. 198
Resolution 1540, on the other hand, makes it explicit that
any enforcement action against non-compliers would require an-
other Council resolution. 199 Moreover, during the Council's
public meeting to discuss a draft of the resolution and the meet-
ing following its adoption, a number of Council Members reas-
sured the broader U.N. Membership that the Resolution was not
about enforcement. Any enforcement, they emphasized, would
require another Council decision z.2 1
CONCLUSION
The U.N. Charter was drafted, and the United Nations has
197. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, supra note 1, at 2 (authorizing member States to use
"all necessary means" to implement Resolution 660); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR,
4370th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1368 (2001) (expressing the Council's readiness to "take
all necessary steps" to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks).
198. See OOSTHUIZEN & WILMSHURST, supra note 27, at 4 (also stating that "a legiti-
mate fear arises when one sees the draft resolution under Chapter VII, with language
such as that used - to combat by all means' - an authorization is being sought which
could justify coercive actions envisaged in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, including
the use of force.").
199. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, 11 (noting the Council "Expresses its inten-
tion to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate
level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end."); see also Lavalle,
supra note 2, at 419 (stating that Resolution 1540 "nowhere refers, even implicitly, to
the taking of any kind of action against states not complying with it").
200. See, e.g., Statement by Adam Thomson, Deputy Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 11,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (stating that any enforcement action would require a new
Council action); Statement by James Cunningham, Deputy Permanent Representative
of the United States, to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 17,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (stating that "the draft resolution is not about enforce-
ment.").
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lived much of its life, in a world where States were the major
threat to peace, in large part because they controlled the weap-
ons that could threaten international peace and security. As the
last few years have made clear, this is no longer the case. Today,
the greatest threats are posed by non-State terrorists and terror-
ist groups and the risk that they might come to possess WMD.
The challenge for the U.N. system, and the Security Council in
particular, given its primary responsibility for maintaining inter-
national peace and security, has been and remains, to find ways
to address such threats in a sovereignty-centered system.2 °1
Rather than being able to address non-State actors directly, the
Security Council must rely on the cooperation of States to imple-
ment its measures within their respective jurisdictions against
the relevant individuals, entities, and groups. Therefore, in or-
der to be able to target terrorists and terrorist organizations ef-
fectively, the Council had to adopt a series of detailed measures
through the intermediary of State action.2 0 2 The alternative was
201. Prior to September 2001, the Council did adopt measures to address threats
posed by non-State actors, generally as part of its effort to address civil wars or other
intra-State conflicts. On a number of occasions, the Council imposed economic or mili-
tary sanctions against non-State entities. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess.,
1428th mtg. at 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 897 (1968)
(regarding Southern Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3039th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3145 mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (regarding Somalia); S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3138th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992) (regarding Liberia); S.C. Res. 1132, U.N.
SCOR, 51st Sess., 3822 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997); and S.C. Res. 1306, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (2000) (regarding Sierra Leone).
In these cases, however, the Council imposed obligations (to implement the measures)
only on U.N. Member States. The Council has imposed obligations on non-State enti-
ties in the context of addressing all of the parties to an internal armed conflict. Thus,
for example, during the 1990s in demanded that the Bosnian Serbs (who were not
representing a recognized government or State) accept a proposal for territorial settle-
ment to resolve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992); see also S.C. Res. 942, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3428th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/942 (1994). Similarly, the Council
imposed similar obligations against the Unido Nacional Para a Independtincia Total de An-
gola ("UNITA") in an effort to resolve the Angolan conflict, against the Taliban and
members of al Qaeda, and against the different factions in the conflict in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. See S.C. Res. 1127, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3814th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1127 (1997); see also S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3891st
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (1998); S.C. Res. 1295, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4129th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1295 (2000) (addressing UNITA); S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15,
1999); S.C. Res. 1333; U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333
(2000); S.C. Res. 1355, U.N. SCOR, 4329th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1355 (2001).
202. The Security Council has targeted individuals, groups, and entities directly, by
establishing Council committees to designate and maintain lists of such non-State ac-
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to have merely urged or demanded all States to do more to com-
bat terrorism, without establishing any global standards or
norms for States to meet. In both Resolution 1373 and 1540, the
Council chose the more ambitious route, requiring States to take
a number of detailed steps within their jurisdictions to address
the terrorist threat and it established a committee to work with
States to monitor the implementation of measures. Although
both Resolutions allow States considerable discretion in imple-
menting the various measures, the Council has nevertheless pro-
vided States with a detailed prescription for how to combat ter-
rorism and prevent terrorists from getting their hands on WMD.
In the end, however, it is up to the States to take the necessary
action within their jurisdictions.
The question of whether the Council has the authority to
act as a "global legislator" is not simply a theoretical one.
Rather, there would be serious practical consequences, includ-
ing to the credibility of the United Nations, if this Council action
were to be viewed by most observers as illegitimate or, worse,
illegal. Although this result could not prevent the Council from
engaging in such action, it would likely reduce the level of coop-
eration the Security Council received from States in implement-
ing its "global legislative" measures. Without such cooperation,
the Council-imposed measures become hollow and the Council
would be less likely to use this tool in the future. Such a result is
neither in the interest of the United Nations nor its Member
States, as the Council needs to be able to use this instrument
effectively in order to address adequately the global, non-State
tors, and by requiring all States to implement a series of sanctions (e.g., asset freeze,
travel ban, and/or arms embargo) against those on such lists. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1343,
U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4287th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (2001) (establishing the
Liberia Sanctions Committee (which was terminated in Resolution 1521 (Dec. 22,
2003)), charging it with, inter alia, designating the individuals subject to the sanctions
imposed by the Resolution); S.C. Res. 1132; U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3822 mtg. at 4, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997) (establishing Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee and charg-
ing it with, inter alia, "designat[ing] expeditiously members of the military junta and
adult members of their families whose entry or transit is to be prevented . . . ."); S.C.
Res. 1127, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3814th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1127 (1997) (re-
questing the Angola Sanctions Committee to oversee designation of officials and adult
members of their immediate families who entry or transit is to be prevented and whose
travel documents, visas or residence permits are to be suspended or cancelled.). As
Frowein and Kirsch have correctly pointed out, however, the Council is not addressing
these non-State actors directly. Rather, it is "subject[ing] them to enforcement mea-
sures through the intermediary of State action." Frowein & Kirsch, Introduction, supra
note 44, at 716.
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threats of the new century.20 3
203. See, e.g., Press Release, United Nations, Statement by Ambassador John Dan-
forth, US Representative to the United Nations, on the Situation in the Middle East, to
the General Assembly, July 16, 2004, available at http://www.un.int/usa/04print_130.
htm (stating that if the ICJ's interpretation of Article 51 was sustained, "then the United
Nations Charter could be irrelevant in a time when the major threats to peace are not
from [S]tates, but from terrorists").
